On May 26, 2025, the Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, staged a military parade in Benghazi to mark the 11th anniversary of Operation Al-Karama. This event, held at a newly established military compound and broadcast to a global audience, served as a clear demonstration of the LNA’s expanding arsenal, featuring an impressive lineup of newly acquired Russian-made military equipment. Among the standout systems unveiled were the Tor-M2 short-range air defense missile system and the BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers, both appearing in Libya for the first time. This display, which openly defied the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 arms embargo in place since 2011, revealed the depth of Russia’s growing military support for the LNA and hinted at a shifting power dynamic in Libya and the broader Mediterranean region.
The parade’s centerpiece was the debut of the Tor-M2 air defense system, a sophisticated platform designed to counter a variety of aerial threats. Capable of engaging tactical unmanned aerial systems, precision-guided munitions, and fast-moving aircraft, the Tor-M2 excels at detecting and neutralizing targets with low radar cross-sections, even in challenging, cluttered environments. Its effectiveness against swarm attacks and its ability to operate independently in remote or contested areas make it a game-changer for the LNA. This system provides a protective shield for both static military assets and mobile units, defending against low- and medium-altitude assaults. For eastern Libya, where air superiority and drone operations have shaped past conflicts, the Tor-M2’s mobility and self-sufficiency could reshape how the LNA approaches defense, offering enhanced protection for critical infrastructure and command structures.






Equally notable was the appearance of two BM-30 Smerch multiple launch rocket systems, a powerful artillery platform that bolsters the LNA’s long-range strike capabilities. Developed in the 1980s, the BM-30 remains a formidable weapon, able to fire 12 rockets in under 40 seconds with a range extending up to 90 kilometers. It can deliver an array of munitions, including thermobaric warheads, anti-personnel cluster rounds, and anti-tank submunitions, all guided by modern fire control systems and satellite navigation for improved accuracy. This allows the LNA to hit targets at stand-off distances, beyond the reach of retaliatory fire, suggesting a potential evolution in its operational approach toward deep-strike missions. While the exact source of these systems remains unclear, they were likely supplied either directly by Russia or through the United Arab Emirates, a known operator of the BM-30 and a longtime backer of the LNA.
Beyond these headline-grabbing systems, the parade showcased a wide range of additional equipment that reflects the LNA’s ongoing modernization. More than 120 Russian-made VPK Spartak mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles rolled through Benghazi, accompanied by a fleet of new Kamaz and Ural military trucks that enhance the LNA’s logistical capacity. The parade also featured a growing collection of unmanned aerial vehicles, many of Chinese origin, including the Volitation VT370, QP537 VTOL, and SATUAV V15, alongside agricultural drones repurposed for surveillance. These additions point to the LNA’s increasing reliance on asymmetric warfare tools. Legacy systems from the Gaddafi era, such as Scud-B ballistic missiles and Luna-M artillery rockets, were also present, still capable of delivering substantial payloads over short to medium ranges despite their age. Meanwhile, the LNA has upgraded some of its older hardware, fitting T-55 and T-72 tanks with anti-drone cage armor—similar to modifications seen in Russia’s Ukraine operations—to counter threats like anti-tank guided missiles and first-person-view drone attacks. BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles appeared with added skirt protection, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft guns showed minor armor enhancements.
The parade offered further evidence of Russia’s expanding role in equipping the LNA. Alongside the Tor-M2 and BM-30 Smerch, other Russian systems on display included a Mi-26 heavy-lift helicopter—the world’s largest, with a 20-tonne payload capacity—a BTR-82 armored personnel carrier armed with a 30mm cannon, and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems. While some Pantsir-S1 units, mounted on MAN chassis, hinted at past Emirati contributions, the reduced presence of UAE-sourced gear compared to previous parades suggested a pivot toward Russian suppliers. The origins of the Tor-M2 and BM-30 remain murky, but their presence, alongside other high-end Russian assets, implies deliberate state-level support, either directly from Moscow or via intermediaries. Given the Tor-M2’s rarity and expense, its transfer to the LNA likely ties into Russia’s broader strategy to establish a stronger presence in the Mediterranean, particularly as its footprint in Syria has diminished.
Russia’s military involvement in Libya has intensified since 2022, with airbases like al-Khadim, al-Jufra, and Brak al-Shatti transformed into logistics hubs hosting S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, MiG-29 fighter jets, and Su-24 strike aircraft. These efforts are now overseen by the Africa Corps, a Russian Ministry of Defense unit that succeeded the Wagner Group, with over 2,000 personnel reportedly active in Libya. Moscow’s pursuit of naval access at Tobruk, which would place a Russian outpost near NATO’s southern flank, adds a strategic layer to its support for the LNA. The attendance of Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, and Belarusian KGB head Ivan Tertel at the parade further emphasized the event’s international weight.
The LNA’s aerospace capabilities also received a boost, with two French-made Eurocopter AS332 Super Puma utility helicopters, painted in desert camouflage and bearing Libyan Air Force markings, joining the lineup. These were accompanied by a Mil Mi-26, making Libya the fourth African nation to operate this massive helicopter, as well as SA341 Gazelle and AgustaWestland AW109 models, all enhancing the LNA’s mobility and logistical reach. On the ground, troops displayed Chinese-made WRJ-Q02 anti-drone guns, lightweight devices designed to disable small and medium UAVs, reflecting the rising importance of counter-drone tactics. Dozens of Toyota 4×4 technicals in various configurations, some equipped with jamming devices, rolled alongside U.S.-made Tomcar TX all-terrain vehicles and several Ford cars, adding to the LNA’s diverse fleet.
The parade’s mix of cutting-edge and legacy systems painted a picture of an LNA adapting to modern warfare while leveraging its existing resources. MiG-29 jets and Su-24 strike aircraft, reportedly flown by Russia’s Africa Corps, buzzed overhead, while four Pantsir-S1 systems, including two ex-UAE units on MAN SX45 chassis, reinforced the LNA’s air defense network. The display of Scud-B and Luna-M missiles, though outdated, showed the LNA’s intent to maintain a broad range of options. Meanwhile, the integration of Chinese drones and the retrofitting of tanks and infantry vehicles with protective enhancements underscored a practical approach to evolving threats.
For the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, watching from western Libya, the parade was a stark reminder of the LNA’s growing strength and Russia’s deepening influence. The closure of Black Sea routes to Syria following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Moscow to rely on longer, costlier shipping lanes through the Mediterranean, straining its logistics but also driving its investment in Libya as a regional hub. Haftar’s alignment with Moscow, cemented by this influx of advanced weaponry, has tilted the balance of power eastward, raising concerns in Tripoli and beyond. As the LNA integrates systems like the Tor-M2 and BM-30 Smerch into its operations, its ability to project force and defend its territory has reached new heights, setting the stage for a potentially more volatile future in Libya’s fractured landscape.