In June 2025, the Egyptian Ministry of Defence reportedly finalised a contract valued at approximately $400 million to procure 10 Chinese-manufactured WJ-700 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). This agreement marks a substantial expansion of Egypt’s aerial warfare capabilities and places the nation as the second foreign operator of the platform, following Algeria. The acquisition, detailed in Arabic and Chinese defence reports, represents a move toward high-speed, jet-powered platforms designed for mission sets that existing turboprop systems cannot fulfil.
The deal surfaces amidst a broader deepening of defence ties between Cairo and Beijing. In early 2025, Egypt integrated the Chinese HQ-9B long-range air defence system into its national network. This was followed by the “Eagles of Civilisation 2025” joint air exercises in April, where Egyptian pilots and personnel from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force operated alongside one another. The WJ-700 acquisition serves as the strike-oriented component of this modernisation effort, providing a high-altitude tool for precision engagement in contested environments.
The WJ-700, referred to as “Al-Saqr” or “The Falcon” in regional military circles, is a product of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) HIWING Academy. Unlike the Chengdu Wing Loong series that Egypt has operated since 2018, the WJ-700 utilises turbojet propulsion rather than a turboprop engine. This engineering choice shifts the platform’s performance profile from persistent loitering to rapid response and standoff strike.
Performance specifications indicate an attack speed of up to 700 kilometres per hour. For comparison, the Wing Loong II, which Egypt acquired through a 2018 agreement with China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), reaches a maximum speed of roughly 370 kilometres per hour. By doubling the operational speed, the WJ-700 reduces the time window for enemy detection and reaction. It also allows the aircraft to transit to target areas more quickly, a notable advantage when responding to time-sensitive intelligence in remote border regions.
Survivability is a central pillar of the WJ-700 design. The drone operates at a service ceiling of 15,000 meters, or approximately 50,000 feet. This altitude places the aircraft above the effective engagement range of most man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and many short-range surface-to-air missiles. At these heights, the drone can maintain a wider field of view for its sensors while remaining in a safer portion of the airspace than lower-altitude Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) systems.
The weapons suite of the WJ-700 allows Egypt to conduct missions that go beyond traditional reconnaissance and light counterinsurgency. The platform supports a payload of up to 800 kilograms across four underwing hardpoints. The reported munitions package includes specialised missiles that enable the drone to penetrate or suppress sophisticated defensive networks.
The CM-102 anti-radiation missile is perhaps the most critical addition to Egypt’s unmanned inventory. These missiles are designed for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), a mission that involves detecting and destroying enemy radar emitters. By utilising the CM-102, Egypt can use the WJ-700 to blind enemy air defence networks from a distance, paving the way for manned fighter jets or other strike assets.
The C-705KD anti-ship missile provides a secondary, specialised role. This munition allows the drone to strike maritime targets or hardened land-based structures from a standoff range. These capabilities demonstrate a shift in Egyptian naval and border security strategy, emphasising the ability to neutralise threats before the drone enters the “kill zone” of enemy point defences. While turboprop drones often rely on laser-guided bombs that require the aircraft to fly directly toward or near the target, the WJ-700 focuses on long-range delivery.
In the context of the Egyptian Air Force, the WJ-700 is expected to complement rather than replace the existing fleet of Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II aircraft. Defence analysts describe this as a “high-low” mix. The Wing Loong series provides cost-effective, long-endurance surveillance for monitoring borders or conducting routine internal security. These platforms remain airborne for up to 20 to 32 hours but are vulnerable in high-threat environments due to their slow speeds and lower operating ceilings.
The WJ-700 provides the “high” end of the mix, reserved for operations where air defence suppression or high-speed interdiction is required. Its 20-hour endurance is shorter than some turboprop variants when fully armed, yet it offers a higher degree of survivability and a much larger payload of heavy munitions. This tiered approach allows the Egyptian military to allocate its resources based on the specific threat level of a mission, preserving its most expensive assets for the most challenging tasks.
The reported $400 million price tag for just 10 units reflects the advanced nature of the hardware. At approximately $40 million per system, the WJ-700 is significantly more expensive than tactical drones, placing it in a category closer to some manned light-attack aircraft or the high-end American MQ-9 Reaper. This cost includes the ground control stations, satellite communication links, and the initial training and spare parts packages necessary for a new platform type.
Egypt’s reliance on Chinese unmanned systems occurs as negotiations with other suppliers have met various obstacles. In 2024, Turkey agreed to supply Egypt with combat drones, likely the Bayraktar TB2 or the larger Akinci, as part of a diplomatic normalisation process. However, no tangible progress or deliveries have been recorded regarding that specific endeavour.
Instead, Egypt has shifted toward a model of domestic co-production for its lower-tier drone needs. At the EDEX 2025 exhibition in December, Egypt’s Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI) announced multiple agreements for localised manufacturing. This includes a partnership with China’s NORINCO to produce the “Hamza-2,” a combat drone modelled after the ASN-209. Additionally, a memorandum of understanding with the Turkish firm Havelsan aims to co-produce the “Hamza-1,” a vertical-takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAV.
These domestic projects focus on reconnaissance and short-range strike roles, which reinforce the status of the WJ-700 as a premium, imported strategic asset. By building smaller systems at home and importing jet-powered strike platforms from China, Egypt maintains a diversified supply chain that is less susceptible to Western export restrictions or political pressure.
The introduction of the WJ-700 into North Africa alters the regional balance of unmanned power. Algeria’s receipt of four WJ-700 Falcons in March 2024 set a precedent for the region. Egypt’s larger order of 10 units suggests a more intensive integration into its national strike doctrine. These drones provide a deterrent against regional actors who may possess advanced air defence systems, as the WJ-700 is one of the few exportable drones specifically designed to hunt and destroy radar installations.
The shift toward Chinese hardware also notes a technical independence from traditional Western suppliers. For decades, the Egyptian Air Force operated heavily restricted variants of American F-16 fighters that lacked long-range beyond-visual-range missiles. The combination of Chinese HQ-9B air defence, J-10C fighters (currently under personnel training), and WJ-700 drones offers Cairo a technological suite with fewer operational caveats.
The WJ-700 serves as a bridge between the era of the surveillance drone and the era of the unmanned strike jet. As Egyptian personnel begin training on these systems, the focus will likely turn to how these jet-powered units integrate into the existing command and control architecture. If the implementation is successful, the Egyptian Air Force will possess one of the most capable and diverse drone inventories in the Middle East, capable of both persistent border monitoring and high-intensity electronic warfare.