The Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel or AES) has operationalised its Unified Force, representing a substantial transition toward autonomous regional defence. During a ceremony at an air force base in Bamako, Mali, General Assimi Goita presided over the formal launch of this multinational military body. This development consolidates the security cooperation between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, three nations currently managed by military administrations and facing persistent Islamist insurgencies. The creation of this force serves as the latest effort by the triumvirate to integrate their defence capabilities following their collective withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
First proposed in June 2024 by the defence chiefs of West Africa as a 5,000-strong “standby force” to fight the region’s worsening security crises, and although in January, the AES said it was preparing to operationalise the joint force of 5,000 men in the coming weeks
The Unified Force consists of 5,000 personnel tasked with conducting joint interventions against security threats across the three member states. General Daouda Traoré of Burkina Faso leads the force, maintaining a central command headquarters in Niamey, the capital of Niger. This centralised command structure aims to streamline decision-making and reduce the friction typically associated with cross-border military operations. By establishing a permanent command base, the AES intends to demonstrate a level of permanence and institutional depth that differentiates it from previous ad hoc security arrangements in the region.
The military framework for the Unified Force relies on a multi-domain approach. According to details provided by the Nigerien Minister of National Defence, General Salifou Modi, the force integrates air, land, and intelligence assets. This modular capability allows for rapid deployment to volatile regions such as the “triple-border” area, where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) remain active. The inclusion of dedicated aviation assets is a notable technical shift, as it provides the ground force with organic close air support and aerial reconnaissance without relying on external partners who previously dominated the Sahelian airspace.
The strategic plan for these operations, developed by military experts from the three member states, focuses on three pillars: counter-terrorism coordination, strengthened cross-border legal frameworks, and the protection of civilian populations. General Moussa Salaoua Barmou, Chief of General Staff of the Nigerien Armed Forces, stated that upcoming missions will maximise impact through concerted manoeuvres. By synchronising land pushes with shared intelligence feeds, the AES seeks to deny insurgents the ability to exploit national boundaries as safe havens. This operational philosophy emphasises local ownership of security problems, moving away from the Western-led models that characterised the now-defunct G5 Sahel and the French-led Operation Barkhane.
According to officials, the force builds on the momentum of previous joint military operations, notably Operations Yereko I and II, which were reported to have recorded significant successes against terrorist groups in the region.
The technical and material sustainability of the 5,000-strong force relies heavily on a burgeoning partnership with the Russian Federation. In April 2025, Moscow finalised agreements to supply specific weapons, machinery, and specialised military training to the Unified Force. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that Russian specialists would assist in arming these units with equipment tailored for the harsh Sahelian environment. This support follows the deployment of Kremlin-linked Wagner Group elements, now often referred to under the Africa Corps umbrella, which began in Mali in 2021 before expanding into Burkina Faso and Niger.
Mali’s Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, characterised Russia as a permanent ally in the fight against terrorism, reflecting a broader geopolitical realignment in the region. This shift has material implications for the force’s equipment. The AES units increasingly utilise Russian-made hardware, including Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters for transport and attack roles, alongside various armoured personnel carriers. The integration of Russian intelligence-gathering tools and electronic warfare capabilities provides a technical edge in monitoring insurgent communications, although the long-term maintenance of these systems remains a logistical challenge for the nascent alliance.
Funding the Unified Force presents a formidable obstacle. Initial estimates from a June 2024 meeting of West African defence chiefs in Abuja suggested that a regional counter-terrorism force would require approximately $2.6 billion annually. For the AES member states, which are currently isolated from ECOWAS financial markets and subject to various international sanctions, generating this capital requires high levels of internal resource mobilisation. The alliance leaders frame this cost as a necessary investment in sovereignty, arguing that the Unified Force is a concrete expression of political determination against external interference.
The AES maintains that ECOWAS sanctions are inhumane and counterproductive, which fueled their decision to build an independent security architecture. While the Abuja-proposed plan was also intended to prevent further coups, the AES leaders prioritise the immediate tactical necessity of holding territory against jihadist groups. The current command and control structure in Niamey reflects this priority, emphasising battlefield results over the democratic governance frameworks favoured by traditional international donors.
The Unified Force enters an environment of escalating violence. As of late 2025, the deterioration of living conditions in rural areas continues to provide fertile ground for insurgent recruitment. The success of the AES initiative will depend on whether its 5,000 troops can achieve tangible stability where previous larger, better-funded international missions failed. By combining Russian materiel with a unified command under General Traoré, the alliance is betting that regional solidarity and shared tactical intelligence will prove more effective than the fractured security strategies of the past decade.