Sudan’s skies, once a sanctuary for the Sudanese Armed Forces’ precision strikes, have turned into a graveyard for high-tech ambitions. On September 13, 2025, Rapid Support Forces air defences claimed their third Baykar Bayraktar Akinci high-altitude long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicle over Al Khoei town in West Kordofan, a region previously spared the intensity of Darfur’s clashes.
Wreckage photos circulating on social media revealed unmistakable hallmarks: the distinctive nosecone, fuselage remnants, wing fragments, and side control panels, all consistent with the Turkish-made drone’s design. This loss, verified by field commanders and open-source analysts, underscores a grim pattern for the Sudanese Armed Forces; just days earlier, another Akinci met a fiery end over Mershing in South Darfur, igniting mid-air after a market bombing that killed two and wounded others. As the conflict enters its third year, these downings signal more than tactical defeats. They expose the fragility of unmanned superiority in a war where foreign-supplied defences are levelling the aerial playing field, forcing the military to confront a resilient foe equipped with upgraded systems from unexpected patrons.
The Sudanese Armed Forces introduced the Akinci in late 2024 as a game-changer, aiming to reclaim contested skies over Darfur and Kordofan. Developed by Baykar, the Turkish firm co-owned by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law, this platform promised endurance and reach unmatched by earlier models like the TB2. Measuring 12.2 meters long with a 20-meter wingspan and 4.1-meter height, the Akinci handles a 6,000-kilogram takeoff weight and hauls 1,350 kilograms of munitions, sensors, or electronic warfare gear.
Twin engines push it to a 361 kilometres per hour top speed and 280 kilometres per hour cruise, while altitudes up to 40,000 feet—typically 30,000 feet operational—keep it beyond many basic threats. Its 7,500-kilometre range and 24-hour loiter time enable persistent surveillance and strikes, supported by triple-redundant controls, fault-tolerant architecture, and satellite links for beyond-line-of-sight control. In Sudan, these attributes allowed targeted hits on Rapid Support Forces supply lines, artillery, and bases in Nyala, El Fasher, Geneina, and Kordofan, using precision-guided bombs to disrupt advances.
Yet, the Akinci’s battlefield debut has faltered. The Mershing incident on September 4 epitomised the risks. Eyewitnesses told Radio Dabanga the drone struck Manawashi market, killing a woman and a Rapid Support Forces soldier while injuring a worker and another woman, who needed urgent hospital care. Videos shared with the outlet captured the descent, although no further casualties occurred on impact, but the strike’s civilian toll drew condemnation, highlighting the double-edged nature of unmanned warfare—precision promised, yet collateral damage inevitable in urban fights. Rapid Support Forces commanders identified the wreckage as an Akinci, a claim echoed in debris analysis showing Turkish avionics.
This marked the second confirmed loss in 2025, following a July 10 downing over El Fasher, North Darfur’s capital, under siege since May 2024. There, the drone conducted airstrikes on civilian areas, hitting homes, hospitals, schools, and displacement camps in Zamzam, Kuma, and Mellit, per Rapid Support Forces statements. Spokesperson Al-Fateh Qarashi decried the indiscriminate nature, emphasising the toll on non-combatants. Anti-aircraft engagement forced the crash, disrupting Sudanese Armed Forces operations in a besieged city where ground fighting rages. A third, unconfirmed incident in June near Nyala airport followed a similar script, with the drone falling after a suspected strike.
These events coincide with intensified Sudanese Armed Forces drone activity in South Darfur. On September 7, a strike hit Nyala during Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—Hemedti’s—swearing-in as president of the Sudan Founding Alliance, his faction’s parallel government. The rocket, likely drone-launched, slammed into Yashfin Specialised Hospital, killing 35 patients and visitors; the toll may rise as overwhelmed medics treat the wounded. Three days later, another attack wounded an unknown number, further taxing resources in a war that has displaced millions. The Sudanese Armed Forces maintain silence on responsibility, fueling speculation about intent: disrupt logistics and morale, or signal resolve against Rapid Support Forces’ gains.
The Rapid Support Forces’ countermeasures explain the toll. Initially reliant on 23mm and 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns plus man-portable systems like the Soviet SAM-7 and Chinese FN-6, they evolved through foreign aid. Russia’s Wagner Group supplied surface-to-air missiles in 2023, per U.S. Treasury sanctions, enhancing reach against drones and helicopters. Speculation points to advanced man-portable or short-range batteries, though details remain classified. The United Arab Emirates, accused of embargo violations, funnelled Chinese systems via Chad; August 2025 evidence showed FK-2000 short-range defences reaching Rapid Support Forces’ hands, integrating radar-guided missiles with 30mm cannons for layered protection. Satellite imagery confirms installations at Nyala airport, likely key in recent intercepts. Jakud Makwar, deputy head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, warned in June of these arrivals, predicting use in controlled zones.
This buildup tips aerial dynamics. The Rapid Support Forces’ consistent neutralisations challenge the Sudanese Armed Forces’ reliance on unmanned strikes for superiority in Darfur’s siege. Pro-army sources note curtailed flights around El Fasher due to ground threats, while Rapid Support Forces’ Nyala defences—efficient and advanced—bolster posture. The Akinci’s low-observable elements and countermeasures falter against integrated radars; infrared seekers lock on heat signatures during dives, and electronic warfare suites jam but cannot evade salvos.
The Akinci’s Sudanese role reflects broader 2025 trends in drone warfare, where high-endurance platforms dominate asymmetric conflicts. Baykar’s export surge—282 combat drones to 17 nations since 2015, per SIPRI—positions Turkey as a key supplier, but losses mount. In Sudan, Akinci strikes disrupted Rapid Support Forces’ advances, but downings erode fleet strength. Estimates suggest three lost this year, a blow amid embargoes skirting via intermediaries.