Drones have altered the dynamics of aerial warfare by targeting assets that once held clear advantages in mobility and firepower. Attack helicopters, prized for their ability to deliver precise strikes and support ground operations, now encounter risks from these inexpensive unmanned systems.
In multiple conflicts, drones have destroyed helicopters both on the ground and during flight, revealing weaknesses in rotorcraft defences. For African militaries, which often deploy helicopters in counter-insurgency and border patrols against groups using off-the-shelf drones, these events provide direct guidance on adjusting strategies to protect vital air support.
In Ukraine, where the conflict has driven rapid advancements in drone tactics, Russian forces have lost a number of helicopters since the start of the conflict in 2022. Ukrainian drones and air defences have compelled Russia to reposition its rotorcraft farther from front lines and relocate bases deep into its territory to evade strikes. This adjustment has lowered the helicopter loss rate over the past year, but it has also shaped requirements for future designs like the PAK AA, which seeks greater range and speed than current models such as the Kamov Ka-52 and Mil Mi-28N. Those helicopters achieve maximum speeds of about 300 kilometres per hour and combat radii of roughly 200-250 kilometres on internal fuel. Operations now occur at distances of several hundred kilometres, limiting immediate responsiveness but preserving assets.
Specific incidents show drones downing airborne helicopters. In August 2024, a Ukrainian first-person-view drone struck a Russian Mi-28 helicopter in the Kursk region while it was in flight, causing it to crash. The drone closed in rapidly, detonating on impact despite the helicopter’s attempts to manoeuvre. Another case from December 2024 involved a sea drone launching a missile that destroyed a Russian Mi-8 transport helicopter mid-air. In June 2025, Ukrainian forces used drones to attack Russian airfields, engaging various helicopters as some lifted off or hovered. These attacks demonstrate how drones exploit brief exposures, using speed and low signatures to bypass countermeasures like flares or electronic jamming.
Although, as with all high-intensity conflict, many experts believe that eventually, upgrades from the experiences gained on the battlefield in terms of anti-drone warfare will help improve on helicopter models, and strengthen global market position of Russian military equipment.
In Sudan, the civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has seen drones play a central role since 2023. The Rapid Support Forces claimed to have shot down three helicopters among other aircraft in April 2023 during assaults on bases in the east. Drone strikes have targeted military installations in Port Sudan, with explosions in May 2025 linked to unmanned assaults on air and naval facilities, likely damaging helicopters during low-level operations or on the ground. The Rapid Support Forces have employed suicide drones resembling cruise missiles to hit army positions, including air assets, escalating the conflict’s aerial component. These examples demonstrate how non-state or paramilitary groups utilise commercial technology for strikes, thereby challenging conventional forces in both urban and remote areas.
A recent example from Colombia in August 2025 involves a police Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter attacked by a drone while airborne in Antioquia department. The aircraft supported manual eradication of illicit coca crops in the Los Toros area of Amalfi countryside when the drone struck, leading to a crash into a hill that killed 12 officers. Governor Andrés Julián Rendón shared video footage of the incident, confirming the drone’s role in downing the helicopter during a routine low-altitude mission.
These cases reveal patterns that African forces must address, as helicopters remain key for rapid response in vast territories plagued by insurgencies. In Ukraine, losses have forced tactical shifts to longer-range operations, a model that could apply to African scenarios where bases are vulnerable to drone swarms. Sudan’s experiences underline the risks in civil wars where both sides wield unmanned systems, often sourced at low cost. The Colombian incident shows how criminal networks, similar to African militias, use drones against state aircraft in anti-narcotics or counter-terror efforts, exploiting low flight paths.
African militaries face a growing challenge from terror groups, insurgents, and non-state actors who field commercially available off-the-shelf drones for surveillance, strikes, and logistics. Boko Haram in Nigeria has deployed drones for intelligence and attacks, while al-Shabaab in Somalia integrates them into ambushes. To mitigate this, forces can implement layered defences starting with detection through radars and radio frequency sensors that identify drones by signatures or flight behaviours. Systems combining multiple sensors reduce false alarms by cross-verifying data.
Disruption follows with electronic warfare tools like jammers that interfere with drone communications or navigation, forcing them to land or stray. Portable jammers suit field units, while vehicle-mounted versions protect convoys or bases. Physical intercepts include nets launched from ground stations or other drones, or kinetic options like small arms fire for close threats.
Machine learning algorithms analyse patterns to predict drone approaches, enabling pre-emptive actions. Artificial intelligence in counter-systems allows autonomous responses, such as directing jammers or interceptors without constant human input. Also, regional cooperation shares intelligence on drone types and tactics, with joint exercises building shared protocols.
Regulations control drone imports and sales, limiting access for illicit users through licensing and tracking. Investment in local research develops affordable countermeasures, like indigenous jammers or sensors, tailored to African conditions. Training programmes can teach pilots evasive flying and ground crews rapid deployment of defences.
For helicopters, onboard systems like radar warning receivers alert to incoming drones, while flares or chaff distract heat-seeking variants. Air escorts with anti-drone capabilities provide cover during vulnerable phases like takeoff or low-altitude flights. Directed energy weapons, such as lasers, offer future precision neutralisation without ammunition limits.
These measures, when combined, help African forces adapt to drone threats, preserving helicopter utility in operations against asymmetric foes. By drawing from global examples and investing in accessible technology, militaries can maintain an edge in contested spaces.