Since the entry of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of various types—short and long-range, whether for reconnaissance, attack, or suicide missions—into the battlefield, they have posed a critical operational challenge to ground forces, especially regarding the protection of vital and strategic sites. This fundamental shift, like conflict, has forced military actors to reassess their air defence strategies and their ability to withstand the low-cost, high-tech airborne threat.
In the Sudanese context, the conflict has increasingly morphed into an aerial warfare domain, particularly following the operational disintegration of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) within the capital, Khartoum, and earlier in Al-Jazirah State. This shift enabled Sudanese Army forces to reassert control over key military positions and systematically dislodge RSF combatants from urban strongholds where they had been deployed. As a result, the militia increasingly relied on loitering UAVs, believed to be launched from the city of Nyala. These are described as “strategic” UAVs, referring to their ability to fly for long periods, cover great distances, and execute precise strikes targeting sensitive and high-value locations such as airports and command headquarters, or to assassinate prominent figures.
Early Use of UAVs and the Current Shift
Notably, it is important to highlight that the militia had begun using UAVs since the start of the conflict. However, their use at that stage was limited to short-range UAVs (with ranges between 4 and 20 km), primarily used for reconnaissance, artillery fire correction, and dropping 120 mm calibre shells. This limited use contributed to tangible field gains, including the RSF’s expansion outside Khartoum and the seizure of strategic positions, as well as inflicting significant losses on the Sudanese army.
In the current phase, however, and with the shift towards using strategic UAVs, the airstrikes—despite their precision and qualitative damage—have not translated into tangible ground gains. From a strategic calculus perspective, losses suffered by one party do not necessarily lead to gains for the other. Air superiority unlinked to the ability to exploit ground conditions and alter military geography diminishes the value of airstrikes and reduces their military and political significance.
In one major development, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) successfully neutralised a Sudanese military Antonov-12 aircraft near the city of Al-Fashir on April 3, 2025. This incident suggests that the militia has acquired more advanced air defence systems; thus, the potential targeting and disruption of UAV launch platforms now poses a strategically significant threat to the operational capabilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces and may effectively challenge SAF’s air superiority, marking a potentially dangerous turning point in the conflict. In the early stages of the conflict, the militia was able to neutralise helicopters and posed a threat to the army’s drones by using anti-aircraft guns of 23 mm and 14.5 mm calibres, as well as Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) such as the SAM-7 and FN-6. The RSF’s alleged deployment of advanced air defence systems, if substantiated, would pose an escalating threat to the Sudanese Air Force’s operational dominance across multiple theatres of engagement.
What Should Be Done
Regional and international experiences—from the Houthis’ use of UAVs against Aramco facilities, to the capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, which managed to penetrate the Israeli air defense system, and up to the extensive use of UAVs in the Ukraine war—indicate that airspace is no longer a guaranteed domain for powerful states. UAVs have become a real security dilemma for the strong before the weak, due to their difficulty detecting, low cost, and ability to bypass the most advanced defence systems, such as the Patriot and Iron Dome.
In light of these facts, it is expected that the militia in Sudan will seek to move to a new phase, consisting of launching swarms of UAVs against advanced air defence systems that the Sudanese army may seek to introduce. Therefore, the appropriate response—given the absence of an effective solution against UAVs —is to form a multi-layered air defence system commonly known as a multi-layered fire control system that integrates traditional methods with advanced technologies. This system should include anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, C-UAS technologies, and advanced radars connected to early warning systems and automated response weapons. By considering the ability to predict potential targets, military leaders can reconfigure and redeploy the multi-layered system in a way that focuses on protecting strategically important sites, ensuring enhanced effectiveness in facing increasing aerial threats.
Nevertheless, the acquisition of such capabilities—despite financial challenges and the constraints imposed on Sudan—does not inherently ensure operational efficacy. Its efficiency remains fundamentally dependent on the actors’ awareness of the need to achieve a high level of understanding and integration between technical and military personnel. Technical teams are responsible for identifying the best technological solutions to counter aerial threats, while military commanders must choose the optimal locations for deploying these systems to ensure the multi-layered system operates efficiently. Notably, competition between technical and military teams has become a familiar feature in such contexts, as institutional internal conflicts often hinder the achievement of desired goals.
Albadawi Rahmtall: A researcher specialising in critical security studies.
