The Ghanaian Navy stands at a crossroads where its current capabilities, though adequate for routine tasks, fall short of meeting the demands of modern seaborne warfare, particularly against a hypothetically superior naval force. As the naval warfare arm of the Ghanaian Armed Forces, controlled by the Ministry of Defence, the Navy is tasked with maritime patrol, surveillance, fishery protection, coastline defence, and safeguarding critical infrastructure along Ghana’s coast.
However, transforming this small fleet into a combat-ready force capable of contesting control of the sea requires both an immense amount of willpower and a substantial infusion of funding. This article delves into the Navy’s historical roots, its present state, the challenges it faces, and the resources needed to modernise its capabilities, painting a clear picture of what lies ahead for Ghana’s maritime defenders. The story of the Ghanaian Navy begins during World War II with the formation of the Gold Coast Naval Volunteer Force under British colonial rule.
This early unit was created to patrol coastal waters and keep them free of mines, a modest but essential role at the time. After Ghana gained independence from the United Kingdom on March 6, 1957, the nation set out to reorganise and expand its military to address the challenges of sovereignty. In June 1959, a new volunteer force was established, headquartered in Takoradi in the Western Region, drawing personnel from the Gold Coast Regiment of Infantry and led by British Royal Navy officers on secondment. Just a month later, on July 29, 1959, the Ghana Navy was formally born through an Act of Parliament, with divisions based in Takoradi and Accra. The British influence persisted into the early 1960s, with the Royal Navy forming the Royal Navy Element of the British Joint Services Training Team on May 1, 1962, adjusting its relationship with Ghana’s fledgling navy. The first Chief of the Naval Staff was Captain D. A. Foreman, a retired British officer who received a Presidential Commission as a Ghanaian commodore.
However, a turning point came in September 1961 when President Kwame Nkrumah ended the employment of British officers in the armed forces, paving the way for Rear Admiral David Animle Hansen, transferred from the Ghana Army, to become the first Ghanaian to lead the Navy. The Navy’s history is not without its trials. On September 14, 1990, the Ghana Navy Ship *Achimota* was struck by artillery fire from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia while on a fact-finding mission near Monrovia.
The attack claimed the lives of two Ghanaian sailors and three Nigerian nurses, prompting retaliatory airstrikes by the Ghanaian Air Force. This incident exposed the Navy’s vulnerabilities in hostile environments, a lesson that resonates today as Ghana considers the future of its maritime forces. In its current form, the Ghanaian Navy operates a fleet of small patrol vessels designed for tasks like monitoring the Exclusive Economic Zone and protecting fisheries. Among its active ships are four 46.8-meter Snake-class patrol vessels, ordered from China’s Poly Technologies in 2011 and commissioned in February 2012 after delivery in October of that year. The Navy also relies on two former U.S. Coast Guard Balsam-class patrol ships and a second-hand Chamsuri-class patrol boat from the Republic of Korea Navy, known for its “Sea Dolphin” design suited to high-speed patrols.
From Germany, Ghana acquired two Albatros-class fast attack craft in 2005 for $35 million and two Warrior-class, also known as Gepard-class, fast attack craft, named S74 *Nerz* and S77 *Dachs*, for $37 million. Rounding out the fleet are four 40-meter Flex Fighter vessels, referred to in Ghana as River-class Offshore Patrol Vessels, which support extended coastal operations. While these ships serve their purpose for peacetime duties, they offer little in the way of combat power or deterrence against a stronger adversary, leaving the Navy exposed in scenarios beyond routine patrols.
Looking to the future, the Ghanaian Navy’s leadership has recognised the need for change. In June 2010, Defence Minister Lieutenant General J. H. Smith announced plans to acquire over 10 ships as part of a short-term effort to re-equip the Navy and better defend Ghana’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Yet, as of now, the Navy remains far from achieving the combat capacity needed to face a superior foe. To reach that level, experts suggest a modern fleet would require at least four missile-armed corvettes to engage enemy ships at range, three search and rescue helicopters equipped for anti-submarine warfare to tackle underwater threats, a long-range maritime patrol aircraft for enhanced surveillance, and unmanned systems like drones to bolster reconnaissance and operational flexibility.
This kind of overhaul demands more than new equipment—it calls for advanced training, robust maintenance systems, and a shift in operational thinking, all of which add layers of complexity to the modernisation effort. The twin pillars of this transformation are willpower and funding, both of which Ghana must muster in abundance. On the financial front, the nation’s defence budget offers a glimmer of hope. According to GlobalData, Ghana’s defence spending is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of over 11% between 2025 and 2029. The 2024 budget stood at $317 million, down 3.5% from 2020 levels, but projections show it climbing to $509.6 million by 2029. While specific allocations for the Navy in 2025 remain undisclosed, the overall increase suggests room for naval investment, especially given the pressing security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, such as piracy and maritime crime. However, the costs are daunting. A single missile-armed corvette could run upwards of $200 million, with helicopters, aircraft, and unmanned systems adding tens of millions more to the bill. Even with a growing budget, funding such acquisitions will test Ghana’s fiscal priorities.
This January, the Ghana Navy commissioned a forward operating base (FOB) and a new naval ship to boost its navy’s capabilities. The facility is one of 15 other forward operating bases (FOBs) across the country’s northern frontiers for the Ghana Armed Forces, which are at various stages of completion, and are designed to allow the military to swiftly respond to any external hostilities because of increased terrorist activity in West Africa.
On the same day, at Sekondi Naval Base, the president also commissioned the Ghana Navy ship (GNS) Achimota, the largest naval ship in the Ghana Navy at 65 metres in length. Acquired from Japan. GNS Achimota, described by officials as Accra’s largest naval acquisition, completed a 36-day journey from Japan, traveling 10,869 nautical miles (12,508 miles/20,129 kilometres) to reach the African country. GNS Achimota is the third ship to bear the name after two previously decommissioned vessels, and is the largest vessel so far acquired by the Ghana Navy, measuring 65 metres in length, the Ghana Navy stated.
Willpower, though harder to measure, is just as critical. The political leadership must view naval modernisation as a national imperative, committing to long-term planning and resource allocation despite competing demands. Within the Navy itself, there’s a need to foster a culture of innovation, training personnel to operate advanced systems and adapt to new forms of warfare. Ghana’s history shows it has the resolve to take bold steps—Nkrumah’s decision to part ways with British officers in 1961 is one example—but sustaining that determination over years of investment and reform will be the true challenge.
For now, the Ghanaian Navy leans on regional partners, particularly the Nigerian Navy, to keep the Gulf of Guinea secure. Nigeria’s larger and better-equipped fleet has taken the lead in countering piracy and other threats, with Ghana contributing through joint efforts like patrols and exercises. This cooperation is vital, but it’s not a permanent solution. To assert its sovereignty and play a stronger role in regional stability, Ghana must build a Navy capable of standing on its own. A modernised force would not only reduce reliance on allies but also elevate Ghana’s stature as a maritime power in West Africa. The road to a modern Ghanaian Navy is long and costly, requiring a blend of ambition and pragmatism.
The fleet as it stands can handle the basics—patrolling coastlines, protecting fish stocks, and watching over infrastructure—but it’s no match for a serious naval threat. Closing that gap means investing in cutting-edge ships and aircraft, backed by the funds and determination to see it through. With defence spending on the rise and a clear need for action in the Gulf of Guinea, the pieces are in place for Ghana to take this leap. Whether it can summon the willpower and secure the funding to make it happen will determine if the Navy remains a coastal guardian or emerges as a true force on the high seas.
