Chad and France signed a declaration of intent on defence cooperation in Paris on Tuesday, 13 October, during a visit by Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno to President Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace.
The document, signed by the two countries’ defence ministers, identifies military training, technical expertise, the defence industry and technology as areas for future cooperation, with the stated aim of strengthening the capabilities of Chad’s armed forces. Macron wrote on social media that the two sides were “taking a new step forward and formalising the strengthening of our defence partnership, in line with a renewed relationship.” The text provides a written framework for a reconciliation that had already been under way for several months. It does not restore France’s former network of permanent bases in the country, nor does it announce any new arms purchases.
The signing brings to a close, at least on paper, a rupture that began nearly two years ago. On 28 November 2024, Chad announced that it was terminating its defence cooperation agreement with France, a pact last revised in September 2019, and ordered French forces to leave. The withdrawal continued through the following winter. Two Mirage 2000D fighter jets and a tanker aircraft departed Kossei airbase in N’Djamena on 10 December 2024, providing the first visible sign of the pullout, while French garrisons in N’Djamena, Faya and Abéché were handed back in stages. By 31 January 2025, the last French soldiers had departed, ending a military presence that had lasted since Chad’s independence in 1960. Before the withdrawal, France maintained roughly 1,000 troops in the country, its largest remaining deployment in the Sahel at the time.
Chad’s decision followed French withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger earlier in the decade, leaving Paris without a base anywhere in the central Sahel for the first time in six decades. Chadian officials presented the move as an assertion of sovereignty rather than a wholesale rejection of France. The country had already begun diversifying its military partnerships, taking delivery of French ERC-90 armoured cars in 2021, even as the French army was retiring the vehicle in favour of the newer Jaguar.
The thaw began earlier this year. A joint statement issued after talks on 29 January said Macron and Déby sought to establish a renewed partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests, including economic ties. By August, limited security cooperation, primarily training and intelligence support, had already resumed. French personnel returned to Chad in April 2026 to conduct training, intelligence work and small, authorised deployments. Their return did not involve the reopening of fixed installations; instead, small teams now deploy as needed and with N’Djamena’s consent, a marked departure from the permanent garrisons France once maintained.
Since the French departure, Chad’s military has lacked reliable medical evacuation and close air support, capabilities previously provided by French aircraft and crews. Analysts following the issue expect air support, rather than ground deployments, to be the first area of renewed cooperation. The two sides have discussed the possibility of Chad purchasing French helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to rebuild that capability under Chadian, rather than French, command. One detail still under negotiation carries symbolic significance: whether France will regain limited, non-permanent access to its former Sergeant Adji Kossei base in N’Djamena, the last facility it handed over during the 2025 withdrawal.
The broader shift concerns posture as much as equipment. Rather than relying on stationed brigades and fixed installations, the model France is testing in Chad depends on a smaller footprint, shorter rotations and arrangements that Chadian authorities can scale up, pause or end on their own terms. One analyst described it to the trade press as a cautious return “through the side door, with fewer soldiers, less visibility and more dependence on Chadian political consent.” Paris may seek to apply this model elsewhere in a region where the former basing approach has become politically difficult to sustain.
Washington also has a stake in the outcome. Chad is one of the few governments remaining in the Sahel that continues to work openly with Western militaries. Neighbouring Niger, the Central African Republic and Libya all host Russian personnel or Russian-linked forces, and US special forces were training their Chadian counterparts in N’Djamena as recently as August. A Chad that maintains ties with both France and the United States, while remaining open to other suppliers, offers Washington a rare point of continued access in a region where its options have narrowed sharply.
Déby and Macron also used the October meeting to discuss Sudan, calling for a humanitarian truce and a settlement that preserves the country’s unity and territorial integrity. This underscored the instability along Chad’s own borders as it rebuilds ties abroad. For now, the declaration signed in Paris represents a statement of intent rather than a completed framework.