British High Commissioner to Kenya Matt Baugh visited the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) at Manda, on the coast of Lamu, this month to review the centre’s role in counter-terrorism operations under Operation Amani Boni. The visit, reported on 18 October 2026, reaffirmed a trilateral security arrangement between Kenya, the United Kingdom and the United States that has steadily expanded since 2023.
Baugh travelled to the base with Deputy High Commissioner Ed Barnett and British Defence Adviser Brigadier Olly Bryant. They received briefings on the centre’s operational capabilities and its role in intelligence-led operations against al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based militant group that has used the Boni Forest, which spans Lamu, Garissa and Tana River counties, as a staging ground for cross-border attacks for more than a decade.
The briefing covered intelligence fusion, real-time information-sharing and joint operational planning—the practical processes that enable Kenyan, British and American personnel to compare threat data and coordinate patrols without duplicating efforts. CJIATF Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Magut and Operation Amani Boni Commander Brigadier Meshack Kishoyan hosted the delegation and discussed the centre’s contribution to situational awareness across the Boni enclave.
Baugh praised the three-way partnership and confirmed London’s intention to continue building the centre’s capacity to address the evolving demands placed on special operations units working in the area. “Strengthening intelligence cooperation, joint operational planning and inter-agency coordination remains central to countering evolving terrorist threats,” the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) said in a statement after the engagement.
CJIATF is located within Camp Simba, the KDF installation at Manda Bay that also hosts rotating US forces and has long served as a forward base for operations against al-Shabaab fighters sheltering in the Boni Forest. The centre focuses less on direct action than on consolidating satellite imagery, human intelligence, signals intercepts and ground reporting into a unified operating picture on which Kenyan commanders can act promptly.
This intelligence-fusion work has assumed greater importance this year. In July, KDF troops conducting route-clearance patrols under Operation Amani Boni found and disabled four improvised explosive devices planted along supply corridors in the Boni enclave. The military attributed the outcome directly to intelligence-led planning rather than chance discovery. The incident illustrates why allied governments continue to invest in the fusion centre: improvised explosive devices along resupply routes are now as persistent a hazard for Kenyan forces as direct ambushes.
The Manda visit builds on a broader programme of military cooperation this year. On 27 August, Kenyan and US forces held their first combined, installation-wide base-defence exercise at Manda Bay, testing how the two militaries would respond jointly to an attack on the facility itself rather than training separately on the same ground. In March, Kenya and the United States opened a Marine Range and Close Quarters Battle complex at Kenya Navy Base Mtongwe in Mombasa County, providing the Kenya Navy’s marine commandos with a permanent site for live-fire and tactical training. US Africa Command’s Justified Accord 2026 exercise, held from 23 February to 13 March, also included a Kenyan component.
The US relationship is based on a five-year Framework for Defense Cooperation, signed in Nairobi on 25 September 2023 by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and then-Defence Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale. The agreement focuses on counterterrorism cooperation and interoperability between the two militaries. Washington has supported the framework with equipment in recent years, including six MD 530F light attack helicopters delivered in 2020, 12 Bastion armoured personnel carriers supplied in 2018 and Metal Shark patrol boats transferred in 2017. In 2024, Africa Command donated more than 6,700 pieces of body armour and ballistic protection, valued at approximately $1.38 million, to KDF units.
Britain’s contribution has followed a separate but parallel track, with an emphasis on training rather than equipment transfers. A 2020 Ministry of Defence contract with Ravenswood Solutions established Tactical Engagement Simulation in Kenya (TESIK), a system the British Army has used for force-on-force training exercises at its base in Kenya. More recently, British units have tested new capabilities there: in 2025, infantry personnel trialled an AI-enabled loitering munition in Kenya, while the British Army separately demonstrated its ability to manufacture first-person-view attack drones using field-deployed 3D printers. Not every UK engagement has proceeded as planned. London cancelled a Kenya-based military training exercise on 28 July 2026, although officials have not publicly specified which rotation was affected or why.
For analysts monitoring counterterrorism efforts in East Africa, the Manda visit is notable less for what was announced—no new funding or equipment commitments resulted—than for what it confirms about the durability of the trilateral intelligence relationship. Fusion centres such as CJIATF depend on partner nations continuing to provide data and participate in reviews of how that data is used. High-level visits of this kind are among the few public indications that the arrangement remains active rather than dormant.
Al-Shabaab’s continued use of the Boni Forest as a sanctuary means the centre’s workload is unlikely to decline soon. With Washington’s five-year framework running through 2028 and Britain pledging further investment in CJIATF’s capabilities, the next indicator to watch will be whether the trilateral partnership produces a measurable reduction in attacks along Lamu’s supply routes in the coming months, or whether troops, as in July, continue to discover threats only after they have been planted.