The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) to destroy an FK-2000 air defense system operated by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) near Ed Dubeibat, South Kordofan, on 10 February 2026. The strike marked the first confirmed instance of the SAF neutralizing a system that had, for over a year, denied it uncontested use of the skies over central Sudan.
Sudan News Agency footage showed the Akıncı striking the FK-2000’s launcher vehicle first, then following up with a second strike on the system’s tracking radar. The sequence left the battery inoperable. SAF spokesperson Brigadier General Asim Awad described the mission as a “high-precision neutralization” against a system “deployed in operational mode and at full combat readiness”.
The engagement took place in the arid corridors of South Kordofan that link RSF-held territory to Darfur, a stretch of the conflict where mobility and air cover have shaped the wider war between the SAF and the RSF. The strike also marked the foreign combat debut of Roketsan’s MAM-L, a TV-seeker-guided precision munition, employed abroad by a Bayraktar platform.
The FK-2000 is a combined gun-and-missile air defense system developed by China’s CASIC (China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation), mounted on an 8×8 wheeled chassis. It pairs surface-to-air missiles with twin 6-barrel 30mm cannons for close-in defense, and uses a mix of radar and optical tracking to detect and engage targets. Publicly available specifications put its missile engagement envelope at roughly 1.2 to 25 kilometers, with a shorter effective range against cruise missiles. Sudanese military sources said the FK-2000s reached the RSF through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with transfers routed through Chad. Sudan’s government has repeatedly accused the UAE of arming the RSF, a claim Abu Dhabi denies.
Before its loss in February, the RSF’s FK-2000 batteries had built a formidable record against SAF aircraft. Sudanese officials blamed RSF air defenses for downing an Ilyushin Il-76 heavy transport near Babanusa, West Kordofan, in November 2025, as well as several Bayraktar Akıncı and TB2 drones. The SAF initially attributed the crash to a wing fire, but debris consistent with FK-2000 components recovered near the crash site pointed to a shootdown. This finding echoed earlier missile remnants found in Kordofan in September 2025. The loss also came after a run of setbacks for the SAF’s drone fleet. Open-source accounts describe at least 2 Akıncı losses in January 2026 alone, including one claimed by an RSF unit near Dilling, South Kordofan, on 24 January, and open estimates put the unit cost of an Akıncı at roughly $30 million, making each loss a substantial blow to the SAF’s inventory.
The Bayraktar Akıncı, built by Turkey’s Baykar, is a twin-engine UCAV with a 20-meter wingspan, a maximum takeoff weight of roughly 5.5 to 6 tonnes, an operational ceiling near 40,000 feet, and endurance beyond 24 hours. That combination gives the SAF a persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike platform capable of loitering over contested ground long enough to identify and engage mobile air defense assets, a role often described as Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).
The munition used, Roketsan’s MAM-L, is a light precision-guided bomb weighing roughly 22 kilograms, originally derived from the company’s UMTAS anti-tank missile. It typically carries a high-explosive fragmentation warhead effective against light structures, unarmored vehicles, and radar antennas, with an engagement range that extends to around 14 to 15 kilometers depending on release altitude and guidance mode. Its TV-seeker variant allows an operator to track and strike a moving or repositioning target without relying solely on laser designation, a useful feature against a mobile system like the FK-2000.
For the SAF, the strike demonstrates that isolated, standalone short-range air defense (SHORAD) units are vulnerable once detected and tracked by a persistent high-altitude UCAV, particularly when they operate without a broader early-warning network to cue them.