Somalia’s armed forces have reached a more consequential stage than at any point in recent years, but not a stable one. The Somali National Army (SNA) is larger, more active, and more externally supported than it was a decade ago, yet it still carries the structural weaknesses of a force being built in wartime: fragmented recruitment, uneven training, uneven equipment, and persistent dependence on foreign enablers. The latest EUAA assessment says the SNA numbers about 32,000 on paper, but only around 19,000 are de facto deployable. It also says cohesion remains undermined by heavy clan-based recruitment, disparities in training and equipment, and lingering problems of desertion, defections, multiple-job soldiers, and infiltration by al-Shabaab.
That gap between nominal strength and operational reality is the central fact shaping Somalia’s military posture in 2026. The army is not collapsing, and it is not static. It is fighting continuously, particularly against al-Shabaab, but it remains a force whose battlefield performance is shaped as much by institution-building as by combat. In practical terms, Somalia is still trying to convert dispersed armed manpower into a disciplined national instrument of power. The problem is not simply numbers; it is command coherence, sustainment, logistics, and the ability to hold ground once it is taken.
Within that broader picture, Somalia’s elite units remain the clearest sign of progress. EUAA notes that Danab, the U.S.-trained special infantry brigade, had about 1,700 operationally active personnel as of August 2023, after 342 recruits completed training. It also says the United States had trained almost 2,000 fighters by November 2022, although the future of that support was uncertain after Washington suspended some foreign aid programs in 2025. Gorgor, the Türkiye-trained special operation unit, was assessed at about 4,000 soldiers as of March 2024; Türkiye had trained more than 6,000 Gorgor personnel since 2017, though the unit has also suffered desertions and losses in operations. These formations are the best indicators of what the Somali state hopes its broader military will become: more professional, more mobile, and more tightly linked to external training pipelines.
The weakness of the conventional force is even more apparent in the air and maritime domains. EUAA is blunt: the Somali Air Force is not functional. The Navy is described as somewhat more advanced, but still unable to meet the challenges it faces. That means Somalia remains dependent on partners for meaningful air support, wide-area surveillance, and higher-end interdiction, while its maritime capability is still catching up with the requirements of coastline security, trafficking control, and protection of sea lanes. In strategic terms, Somalia’s military remains land-centric, infantry-heavy, and externally supported in the domains where modern armed forces are supposed to have independent reach.
Foreign military assistance remains indispensable, and that dependence is visible in both training and combat support. AFRICOM reported U.S. airstrikes in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia on March 19 and March 27, 2026, targeting al-Shabaab. Those strikes underline a basic reality: Somali forces are still fighting with partner-enabled airpower when operations require rapid reach or precision effects. At the same time, the UN Security Council has continued to regulate the arms environment tightly. Resolution 2776 reaffirmed the embargo on al-Shabaab while exempting deliveries to Somali state forces, and Resolution 2806 later renewed the embargo measures, maritime interdiction, and the panel of experts mandate while welcoming Somalia’s National Counter-IED Strategy. Somalia is therefore building its armed forces inside a heavily supervised supply regime, which is both a safeguard and a constraint.
That regulatory framework matters because Somalia is trying to professionalise its force structure while also preventing leakage into non-state hands. The government has been working on weapons and ammunition management, and the UN’s December 2025 resolution specifically welcomed the National Counter-IED Strategy and called for further implementation measures. This is a sign of institutional maturity, but also a reminder of how far Somalia still has to go before it can manage stocks, transfers, and storage at the level expected of a consolidated military establishment. In a theatre where improvised explosive devices remain a defining threat, ammunition control and counter-IED capacity are not peripheral issues; they are core combat capabilities.
The broader security environment remains severe. Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026 says al-Shabaab continued to carry out numerous indiscriminate and targeted attacks, while civilians continued to bear the brunt of conflict and political violence. That is the operational context in which the Somali armed forces must function. They are not merely defending institutions in the abstract; they are trying to preserve state authority in a battlespace where insurgents retain the ability to strike cities, contest roads, intimidate communities, and recapture ground when pressure eases. Somalia’s military problem, then, is not the absence of armed men. It is the absence of full-spectrum dominance.
The most accurate reading of the Somali armed forces today is that they are no longer a symbolic institution, but they are not yet a fully normalised national military. They have better-trained elite units, a more visible counterterrorism role, and continued external backing from the United States and Türkiye, but the force still lacks the cohesion, airpower, naval depth, and logistical maturity that define a mature defence establishment. Somalia’s soldiers are fighting harder and often better than before. What remains unfinished is the system around them.