Jihadist groups in Africa’s Sahel have expanded their operations dramatically, doubling the geographic scope of attacks and operating across an area exceeding one million square kilometres—twice Spain’s size. An AFP analysis of Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) records shows nearly 77,000 deaths since 2019, with violence persisting into November 2025 amid ongoing blockades and turf wars.
Also, a United Nations finding in 2024, explains that “In just a matter of years, Africa has become the ‘global epicentre of terrorism’, with groups such as Da’esh, Al-Qaida and their affiliates exploiting local conflicts and fragilities to serve their own ends, the UN Secretary-General said on Wednesday, calling for violent extremism to be rooted out.”
Surge in Violence
Factions linked to Al-Qaeda, especially the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), and the Islamic State (IS) now target nearly all of Mali and Burkina Faso, extending from western Niger and Nigeria to the Senegal border. A secondary violence hub thrives near Lake Chad in eastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram and IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) maintain strongholds.
This assessment draws from AFP’s review of six years of ACLED data, an independent monitor tracking global conflicts. Attacks surged from 1,900 in 2019—mostly along the Mali-Burkina Faso border—to over 5,500 in 2024. Through October 10, 2025, another 3,800 incidents occurred, pushing the six-year total to 28,715.
Al-Qaeda’s push into western Mali and southern Burkina Faso, paired with IS gains in western Niger and Nigeria, has swollen the operational zone to more than 386,000 square miles. The United Nations estimates Al-Qaeda and IS command 7,000 to 9,000 fighters combined, while ISWAP fields 8,000 to 12,000.
Recruitment and Funding Tactics
These groups exploit deep social and ethnic divides in some of the world’s poorest areas to swell ranks. Financing comes from kidnappings for ransom, cattle rustling, and imposed “Islamic taxes.” Recruits often join for one-off payments, spoils from raids excluding weapons, or religious indoctrination, according to Aly Tounkara, executive director of the Centre for Security and Strategic Studies in the Sahel.
Armed mainly with looted weapons, both Al-Qaeda and IS affiliates account for roughly half of the 76,900 fatalities since 2019, including losses among their own members. Clashes with national armies dominate, but nearly 16,000 civilians have perished in targeted strikes.
Nigeria tallies over 20,000 deaths, yet Mali and Burkina Faso shoulder 56 percent of the toll. Military juntas in both nations have expelled Western forces, including French troops, in recent years, shifting to domestic-led counterterrorism.
Limited Gains from Military Focus
Charlie Werb, an analyst at Aldebaran Threat Consultants, notes that Mali and Burkina Faso’s emphasis on brute military force has produced “at best, limited and at worst, counterproductive” outcomes. Without tackling underlying socio-economic drivers, jihadist sway has grown unchecked.
ACLED data reveals JNIM’s strategy to isolate capitals by hitting peripheral roads. Since 2019, the group has ringed Ouagadougou from northern Burkina Faso, endangering ties to Ivory Coast, Togo, and Mali. Around Bamako, once distant from the fray, jihadists logged 130 road attacks in 2025 alone—tenfold the 2021 figure.
Western Advances and Supply Disruptions
JNIM presses westward too: the Kayes region in Mali endured more strikes in 2025 than the prior five years combined. Bordering Senegal, Mauritania, and Guinea, Kayes serves as Mali’s vital corridor for food and fuel, lacking direct sea access.
From September, JNIM hit tanker convoys from the west, sparking a month-long blockade that depleted national fuel stocks, per the National Office of Petroleum Products. By mid-November, the chokehold lingered, prompting mass evacuations from desert towns and French advisories for citizens to flee Mali. Bakary Sambe, director of the Timbuktu Institute, calls Kayes a “strategic economic corridor” to Dakar’s port; disrupting it erodes the regime’s supply chain to Bamako and warrants vigilance from Senegal and Mauritania.
A July 1 offensive struck seven western towns, including Kayes and highway junctions to neighbors. JNIM’s tactics extended to record foreign kidnappings—Chinese, Indian, and others seized between May and October—further straining Mali’s resources.
Lake Chad Flashpoint
Near Lake Chad, ISWAP and Boko Haram vie for dominance. A November turf war in northeastern Nigeria claimed about 200 lives, underscoring factional rifts amid broader insurgent gains. September alone saw over 250 fatalities in Borno state from ambushes and raids, with more than 20 such attempts in 2025.
JNIM’s reach even touched Niger, where it killed a soldier in a cross-border raid, per Nigerian reports. These developments signal no respite, as Werb cautions: the crisis defies simple solutions.
Defence forces must blend kinetic operations with governance reforms to curb recruitment and secure supply lines. Regional cooperation, including with neighbors like Senegal, grows essential to blunt jihadist momentum.