Plans for a Hungarian military presence in Chad have hit an unexpected roadblock as President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s administration postpones approval of a proposal to send some 200 soldiers to N’Djamena. The deployment, announced in November 2023 by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as part of Budapest’s broader engagement in the Sahel, was intended to train Chadian forces to counter armed groups operating along Chad’s fraught borders. Yet, more than a year later, the promise of Hungarian troops remains unrealised, caught in debate within the Chadian National Assembly and awaiting presidential endorsement for reasons that have not been made public.
Hungary’s overtures toward Chad have been unusually dramatic for a Central European state with no prior economic or diaspora ties to the Sahel. In 2023, Budapest established a diplomatic mission in N’Djamena, inaugurated a humanitarian coordination centre and pledged up to $200 million in aid for agriculture, education and digitalisation projects. A further €1 million through Hungary Helps has been earmarked for healthcare improvements. Orbán framed these initiatives as essential to stemming migration from Africa, arguing that Europe cannot secure its borders without addressing the root causes of irregular movement in Sahel nations. “Migration from Africa to Europe cannot be stopped without the countries of the Sahel region,” he said last September, describing Chad as a linchpin in any viable strategy.
Chad’s humanitarian needs are stark: more than 40 per cent of its 20 million citizens live on under $2.15 a day, and the country hosts some 1.2 million refugees fleeing conflict in Sudan and the Central African Republic. Supply disruptions from neighbouring Sudan have driven up food prices, magnifying economic pressure. In this context, Hungarian aid—coordinated through the newly opened centre in N’Djamena—aimed to deliver 150 to 200 million euros for sustained development, while also establishing a local footprint to complement traditional Western and multilateral donors.
Against this backdrop, Orbán’s announcement of a military training mission in Budapest alongside Chadian President Déby Itno in September sought to cement bilateral cooperation. Déby’s two‑day visit to Hungary culminated in a first‑ever aid treaty between the two states and the promise of 200 soldiers to bolster Chad’s fight against rebel movements along its borders with Sudan, the CAR and Nigeria. While Budapest secured the blessing of Hungary’s parliament—a Fidesz‑led majority approved the security agreement by a 140‑30 vote in late 2023—Déby’s endorsement has yet to follow. Although a vote in Chad’s National Assembly is required to formalise the deployment, there is no clear timeline as to when legislators might deliberate, and presidential acquiescence remains absent.
Observers point to Déby’s precarious domestic standing as a possible factor. After succeeding his father, long‑time ruler Idriss Déby, amid controversy in 2021, President Déby has faced allegations of a constitutional breach and questions of legitimacy. Street protests in late 2022 were met with a harsh security response that left hundreds dead. Even after elections in May 2025, Déby’s grip on power has been challenged by rival factions within the military and opposition movements, including a fatal February attack on army headquarters by his cousin, Yaya Dillo. In an environment where internal dissent poses a greater threat than external insurgencies, the arrival of foreign troops could be politically fraught.
Chad nonetheless remains one of the more stable states in the Sahel, its armed forces having driven rebel groups to the periphery and maintained relative internal order. Control Risks analyst Beverly Ochieng noted that Chad’s military strength and stability make it an attractive partner for external powers seeking footholds in the region. “Chad has one of the strongest armies in the region,” she said, while cautioning that Hungary’s troops will lack the counterterrorism pedigree of more seasoned forces. Dan Eizenga of the U.S.‑based Africa Center for Strategic Studies echoed this point, observing that Hungarian soldiers have no prior operational experience in the Sahel and would likely be confined to training or advisory roles.
Hungary’s broader European posture further complicates the picture. As an ally of Russia on the Ukraine war and a frequent opponent of additional EU aid to Kyiv, Budapest has leveraged its influence to redirect 14 million euros of EU Peace Facility funding toward Chad. The European Peace Facility, designed to pool member-state contributions for military aid, has primarily been devoted to supporting Ukraine since its inception in 2021. By pushing for approvals from other EU capitals, Orbán seeks a muted, strategic shift of resources, yet Brussels has not explicitly ratified the transfers.
In the wider contest for influence across Africa, Hungary’s bid faces stiff competition. Russia’s Wagner Group—rebranded as the Africa Corps—has established a foothold in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. At the same time, Beijing and Washington compete for economic and security partnerships on the continent. France and the United States maintain small contingents in Chad, though Paris has drawn down its footprint in the wake of Sahelian coups, and a diplomatic spat in May 2025 briefly curtailed Washington’s presence. Chad’s detention of four visiting Russian operatives in September signalled its refusal to tolerate unchecked foreign interference, a stance that gives N’Djamena leverage in negotiating terms with prospective partners.
For President Déby, welcoming Hungarian trainers could bolster his international credentials and deepen ties with Europe’s rotating presidency under Budapest’s leadership. Yet the delay in signing off on troop deployments suggests a careful weighing of internal politics against external benefits. Analysts warn that regimes lacking a strong democratic mandate often turn to foreign security partners to shore up their power, a move that can leave them beholden to outside interests over domestic constituencies.
As the Sahel’s security crisis intensifies, Chad’s choices will reverberate across the region. A Hungarian training mission could enhance the capabilities of one of the few remaining pro‑Western armies in the Sahel, offering a counterweight to Russian and jihadist influence. Conversely, further delays risk leaving Déby’s forces reliant on a patchwork of external support and may exacerbate perceptions of fragility.
