# Military Africa

Defence news, Aerospace, Military, Technology, and security news in Africa

- Site: https://www.military.africa/

## Urgent dry-docking ensures SAS Amatola safely return to sea

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/urgent-dry-docking-ensures-sas-amatola-safely-return-to-sea/
- Published: 2026-10-12T12:46:43+01:00
- Author: Military Africa

Urgent dry-docking ensures SAS Amatola safely return to sea Armscor Dockyard, working
in close collaboration with the South African Navy, has successfully completed urgent
maintenance on the [SAS Amatola](https://www.military.africa/2025/01/sas-amatola-begins-naval-patrol-after-extensive-refit/),
demonstrating a renewed focus on responsiveness, operational readiness and improved
service delivery to the country’s maritime defence capability.

The vessel [required immediate dry-docking](https://www.military.africa/2026/07/armscor-and-the-south-african-navy-unite-to-restore-the-dockyard/)
to address defects identified on its underwater hull and to undertake essential 
maintenance before she could safely return to sea. The underwater hull is a critical
component of a naval vessel’s seaworthiness, providing structural integrity and 
protection against the demanding effects of the marine environment. Through the 
combined application of engineering expertise, disciplined project management and
decisive response to the operational requirement, Armscor Dockyard and the South
African Navy completed the maintenance project in approximately three weeks.

The [work ](https://www.military.africa/2026/07/armscor-and-the-south-african-navy-unite-to-restore-the-dockyard/)
included addressing identified repair requirements, surface preparation and the 
restoration of the vessel’s marine coating system. These interventions are essential
to preserving the integrity of the vessel and supporting her continued operational
availability. Reflecting on this milestone, Armscor CEO, Advocate Solomzi Mbada,
said the successful completion of the project demonstrates the organisation’s commitment
to delivering responsive and effective solutions to the South African Navy.

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Caption-SAS-
1.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

SAS 1: A combine efforts between Armscor Dockyard and South African Navy deliver
a rapid turnaround on SAS Amatola maintenance to ensure operational readiness.

“The successful completion of the SAS Amatola maintenance project in approximately
three weeks is an important demonstration of what can be achieved when technical
expertise, collaboration and focused execution are brought together around a clearly
defined operational requirement. This is the kind of responsiveness that our clients
expect from Armscor, and it reflects our commitment to continuously improving the
way we deliver on our mandate.” Adv. Mbada said the project should be viewed not
only as a successful maintenance intervention, but also as an opportunity to strengthen
the approach to future urgent maintenance requirements. “The SAS Amatola project
has provided us with a valuable model for responding to urgent vessel maintenance
requirements.

It reinforces the importance of alignment between Armscor Dockyard, the South African
Navy and our industry partners, supported by clear accountability and disciplined
project execution. We intend to build on this experience and continue finding ways
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.” The successful
turnaround also highlights the flexibility and capability of Armscor Dockyard to
respond to both planned and emergent maintenance requirements. As part of its mandate,
Armscor remains committed to supporting the restoration and sustainment of the South
African Navy’s fleet through appropriate maintenance interventions and collaboration
with relevant service providers.

“The [readiness and sustainability of the South African Navy’s](https://www.military.africa/2021/08/cash-strapped-south-african-navy-cant-maintain-major-warships/)
fleet remain important priorities. Armscor Dockyard has an important role to play
in supporting this capability, and we are committed to working closely with the 
Navy and our service providers to ensure that maintenance requirements are addressed
with the necessary urgency, professionalism and technical rigour,” said Adv. Mbada.
The SAS Amatola project demonstrates the value of collaboration, engineering capability
and focused execution in achieving a rapid maintenance turnaround. Armscor will 
continue to strengthen these approaches as part of its broader commitment to improved
service delivery and the sustainment of South Africa’s maritime defence capabilities.

## Morocco’s Aerodrive Wins First Domestic Loitering Munition Deal

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/moroccos-aerodrive-wins-first-domestic-loitering-munition-deal/
- Published: 2026-10-12T11:48:26+01:00
- Author: Ekene Lionel

According to [Unmanned Africa](https://www.unmanned.africa/moroccos-aerodrive-wins-first-domestic-loitering-munition-deal/),
Morocco has awarded its first confirmed domestic contract for loitering munitions,
with Rabat-area manufacturer Aerodrive Engineering Services securing an order to
supply 500 of the weapons to the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (FAR), according to
reporting from Africa Intelligence. The deal marks the clearest sign yet that Morocco
intends to build a genuine domestic kamikaze drone industry rather than simply importing
the technology, and it extends a defence-industrial diversification drive the kingdom
has pursued with unusual consistency since the early 2020s.

## What Is Known About the Contract

Details of the Aerodrive agreement remain limited. Regional defence reporting places
the expected production site at Benslimane, an industrial hub in the Casablanca-
Settat region roughly 50 kilometres east of Rabat, with the facility potentially
entering service around 2027. Loitering munitions, sometimes described as kamikaze
or suicide drones, are uncrewed aircraft that carry an explosive payload and circle
above a target area until an operator identifies and strikes a target, effectively
combining reconnaissance and precision strike in a single low-cost airframe. Their
appeal lies in bridging the gap between expensive precision-guided missiles and 
unguided artillery, giving smaller or budget-constrained forces a way to hit specific
targets without the cost of a cruise missile or the imprecision of massed indirect
fire, a category of weapon that has grown enormously in prominence since Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and, more recently, in exchanges involving Iran, Israel and 
the United States across the Middle East.

Some regional reporting has linked Aerodrive to Israeli technology transfer, though
the precise nature of that connection, and whether it involves a formal partnership,
licensing arrangement or something looser, has not been independently confirmed.
What is confirmed is that Aerodrive’s win does not stand alone. It lands in the 
middle of a separate, already well-documented Moroccan loitering munition programme
built around Israeli technology, raising a genuine question this reporting cannot
yet resolve: whether Aerodrive represents a second, competing domestic effort, or
whether it is connected in some way to the programme already under way at the same
industrial hub.

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-1.png?
resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-2.png?
resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-3.png?
resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

Moroccan startup Aerodrive Engineering Services recently won a contract to supply
the Royal Armed Forces with 500 suicide drones.

## A Parallel Track Already in Motion

[Military Africa reported in November 2025](https://www.military.africa/2025/11/morocco-begins-local-production-of-israeli-spyx-loitering-munitions/)
that BlueBird Aero Systems, a subsidiary of state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries(
IAI), had hosted a delegation of Moroccan engineers and technicians for specialised
training on manufacturing its SpyX loitering munition, a rail-launched, expeditionary
system designed for small-unit field deployment, describing the training as a precursor
to opening a dedicated manufacturing plant in the very same Benslimane industrial
hub Aerodrive’s contract now points to. That programme itself followed [Morocco’s incorporation of finished SpyX units into the FAR’s arsenal in 2024](https://www.military.africa/2024/04/morocco-acquired-israeli-spyx-loitering-munition/),
which made Morocco the first African and Middle Eastern country to field the type,
built on defence ties that trace back to the 2021 diplomatic normalisation agreement
between Rabat and Tel Aviv, part of the broader Abraham Accords framework. Since
that pact, Morocco has steadily deepened its Israeli defence relationship, acquiring
the Skylock Dome counter-drone system in November 2021, reaching a provisional aerospace
cooperation agreement with IAI in March 2022, ordering 150 WanderB and ThunderB 
drones from BlueBird later that year, and agreeing to a Barak MX air defence package
from IAI worth more than 500 million US dollars in February 2022.

Whether Aerodrive Engineering Services sits inside that same Israeli-linked supply
chain, perhaps as the eventual local manufacturing vehicle for the SpyX programme
itself, or represents a genuinely separate domestic initiative competing for the
same government requirement, is not something available reporting settles. Readers
should treat the two as parallel developments at the same location rather than confirmed
as the same programme.

## Diversification Beyond a Single Supplier

Whichever the case, the Aerodrive contract fits a pattern Rabat has followed deliberately
rather than by accident. Morocco has spent the past five years building relationships
with multiple foreign drone suppliers simultaneously rather than committing to one,
acquiring the Bayraktar TB2 from Turkey’s Baykar beginning in 2021 under a 70 million
US dollar contract, and going a step further in January 2025 when [Military Africa reported that Baykar would establish its own drone manufacturing facility inside Morocco](https://www.military.africa/2025/01/baykar-to-establish-drone-manufacturing-facility-in-morocco/),
positioning the kingdom as a regional production and distribution hub for Turkish
unmanned systems across Africa. Morocco has separately engaged India’s Tata Advanced
Systems on the production of wheeled armoured platforms, while its counter-drone
posture draws on yet another set of suppliers entirely, Ukraine’s Bukovel-AD system
acquired in 2019 and Israel’s Skylock Dome in 2021. According to Military Africa’s
own drone procurement tracking, Morocco has become by far the largest African recipient
of Israeli-supplied drones, taking delivery of 176 of the 325 Israeli-made units
exported to the continent, concentrated in BlueBird’s WanderB and ThunderB lines,
a scale of concentration no other African buyer approaches.

That approach reflects the scale of ambition behind Morocco’s broader military modernisation.
The kingdom’s defence budget has been reported at close to 15.7 billion US dollars
for 2026, part of a five-year investment plan valued at roughly 20 billion US dollars
that Moroccan officials have described in terms of achieving what one 2021 report
characterised as “regional supremacy.” Loitering munitions fill a specific gap inside
that plan, and one increasingly relevant to Morocco’s actual operating environment.
The FAR has faced border security pressure and asymmetric threats tied to the long-
running Western Sahara dispute, a theatre where a cheap, precise, expendable strike
weapon offers considerably more utility per dollar than a fighter jet sortie or 
a large strategic drone, and where Morocco’s rival Algeria has itself been building
out an extensive layered air defence and strike capability, including Chinese Sky
Dragon systems and Russian air defence equipment Military Africa has separately 
documented across the continent, giving Rabat a clear strategic incentive to keep
pace on the unmanned side of its own arsenal.

## Why Building It At Home Matters

Buying finished loitering munitions from Israel, Turkey or anyone else is a fundamentally
different commitment than manufacturing them domestically. A local production line,
whether Aerodrive’s or an eventual BlueBird-linked facility, insulates Morocco from
the export licensing decisions, political conditions and supply disruptions that
come with depending entirely on a foreign government’s willingness to keep shipping.
It also creates a domestic industrial base capable, in principle, of eventually 
exporting the technology onward, following exactly the trajectory Turkey pursued
with the Bayraktar TB2 over the past decade, from importer to producer to regional
exporter. Morocco’s evident determination to run that same playbook simultaneously
across multiple partners, rather than betting on a single supplier relationship,
suggests Rabat sees the loitering munition sector specifically, and not just drones
in general, as a capability worth building at home regardless of which company or
country ultimately ends up manufacturing it on Moroccan soil.

## Nigeria’s Plan to Buy Saudi KV-107 Helicopters Appears to End

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/nigerias-plan-to-buy-saudi-kv-107-helicopters-appears-to-end/
- Published: 2026-10-10T20:04:19+01:00
- Author: Ekene Lionel

The twelve Kawasaki KV-107 helicopters that Nigeria was [reported ](https://www.military.africa/2026/01/nigeria-eyes-twelve-kawasaki-kv-107-helicopters-from-saudi-arabia/)
in January to be acquiring from Saudi Arabia are back on the market, according to
a source familiar with the matter. Nefer Defence, described as the agency in charge
of the procurement, would prefer to sell the fleet in bulk, together with what the
source calls a plentiful supply of spare parts. Military Africa independently confirm
the sale notice and identifed Nefer Defenceas the sole agency in charge of the sale.
Although, the Nigerian Ministry of Defence, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) or Saudi
authorities have not publicly confirm the transfer or its cancellation in any material
reviewed for this article. The end of the plan is therefore an inference drawn from
the sale notice, not an announced decision.

## What Is on Offer

The fleet is made up of twelve KV-107IIA helicopters in four configurations: five
firefighting aircraft, three multi-purpose cargo, passenger and search and rescue(
SAR) helicopters, two fitted for very important person (VIP) transport, and two 
air ambulances. Nefer Defence describes them as “naval-type helicopters manufactured
between 1978 and 1984, all of which have undergone regular maintenance.” The notice
by Nefer says it is a “naval-type.”

Open-source airframe records are broadly consistent with that profile. They list
sixteen KV-107IIA-SM helicopters built between 1979 and 1984 for the [General Civil Defence Agency of Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior](https://www.helis.com/database/model/Kawasaki-KV-107-ii/cn?filc=SA),
two of which are recorded as written off, in 1987 and 2007. The sub-variants in 
that list cover firefighting, rescue, multi-purpose and air-ambulance roles, the
same spread as the aircraft now being offered.

## A Package That Looks Familiar

One detail complicates the idea that this fleet only recently came back to market.
[A classified listing on the Sky4buy website](https://sky4buy.com/helicopter152937015513/013693),
bearing a March 2018 date stamp, advertised twelve KV-107IIA helicopters in an almost
identical mix: five firefighting aircraft, three rescue and first-aid helicopters,
two VIP transports and two ambulances. It also offered 27 spare engines, 20 gearboxes,
22 rotor hubs and 28 containers of spare parts. The seller described the aircraft
as low-hour machines averaging about 5,000 flight hours and asked US$3 million each.

## How the Deal Was Reported

The original account surfaced in early January 2026 through Honourable Aliyu Ibrahim
Gebi, Special Adviser to the Chief of Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.
He said the military was preparing for the arrival of twelve KV-107s from Saudi 
Arabia. Gebi did not explicitly confirm the transfer, but his record of accurately
anticipating military acquisitions led analysts to treat the claim with weight.

When [Military Africa reported the story](https://www.military.africa/2026/01/nigeria-eyes-twelve-kawasaki-kv-107-helicopters-from-saudi-arabia/)
on 29 January, official statements from the Ministry of Defence, the NAF and Saudi
authorities were all still pending, leaving the delivery timeline and contractual
details in “a state of informal anticipation.” In the eight months since, nothing
on the public record has moved the matter forward.

## The Aircraft

The KV-107 is a licence-built version of the Boeing Vertol Model 107, known in United
States service as the CH-46 Sea Knight. Kawasaki Heavy Industries began production
at Gifu in 1962. Its tandem-rotor layout, with two large rotors mounted one behind
the other, removes the need for a tail rotor and gives the aircraft a wide centre-
of-gravity envelope and stable handling in the hover and in crosswinds. The earlier
Military Africa analysis judged those traits useful across the varied terrain of
the Sahel and the Niger Delta. A rear loading ramp speeds the movement of palletised
cargo and small vehicles, which shortens turnaround times on logistics sorties.

[Published figures for the type](https://aeropedia.com.au/content/kawasaki-kv-107/)
show two CT58 turboshaft engines of 1,400 shaft horsepower each. The CT58 is a General
Electric design built under licence in Japan by IHI. Empty weight is about 5,250
kilograms and maximum loaded weight about 9,700 kilograms, with a service ceiling
near 5,180 metres and a range of about 1,097 kilometres on maximum fuel. The 270
kilometres per hour figure often quoted for the helicopter is its never-exceed speed.
Sea-level maximum speed is closer to 254 kilometres per hour, with cruise around
240.

The January analysis put payload at roughly 4,000 kilograms, enough to move troops,
equipment and supplies to remote areas. Simple subtraction shows the limits of that
number. The gap between empty and loaded weight leaves about 4,450 kilograms for
crew, fuel and payload combined, so a full 4,000-kilogram load cannot travel with
full tanks. [Data for the earlier KV-107/II-2 variant](https://www.airliners.net/aircraft-data/boeing-vertol-kawasaki-kv-107/117)
puts range at only about 175 kilometres when carrying a three-tonne payload with
reserves. That figure may not match the IIA series exactly, but it illustrates the
trade-off between load and distance. The type is also better described as medium-
lift than heavy-lift, a point the January analysis itself acknowledged when it noted
that a CH-47 Chinook offers greater capacity.

## The Saudi Service Record

Saudi Arabia operated the KV-107 for decades, mainly under the Ministry of Interior
for civil defence, security and SAR. The fleet included a firefighting version, 
a multi-purpose transport version and an air-ambulance version. The earlier analysis
said the ambulance aircraft often carried advanced medical kit and could be configured
for emergency surgical procedures. It added that the helicopters supported the Hajj
pilgrimage and took part in high-stakes security operations, including rooftop assaults.
Military Africa has not independently re-verified those operational claims.

## Why Nigeria Was Interested, and What Was Left Open

The January analysis read the reported deal as a pragmatic answer to urgent logistical
needs. Modern heavy-lift helicopters such as the CH-47 Chinook offer more capacity,
but their cost and delivery schedules often put them out of reach for developing
nations. Twelve airframes maintained for civil defence and SAR promised a considerable
increase in lift at a lower cost per unit. The deal was also read as reinforcing
defence ties between Abuja and Riyadh, a reading the sale notice now leaves without
support.

The same analysis flagged the trade-offs. A licence-built type needs a steady supply
of spare parts, particularly for the CT58 engines, and a robust support agreement,
possibly involving third-party maintenance organisations familiar with Japanese-
built airframes. The spares package in the sale notice speaks to that concern, though
the 2018 listing suggests it may be an old offer rather than a new one.

Which service would fly the aircraft was never settled. The recently established
Nigerian Army Aviation Corps has been building its fleet around [MD 530F Cayuse Warrior scout helicopters](https://www.military.africa/2024/02/progress-on-nigerias-ah-1z-viper-acquisition/)
and [Bell UH-1 Huey utility helicopters](https://www.military.africa/2024/06/nigerian-army-aviation-receives-bell-uh-1-huey-helicopters/),
and the KV-107s would have given it its first dedicated heavy-lift capability and
independent troop insertion without relying on NAF assets. The NAF, by contrast,
has the established maintenance infrastructure and training programmes, which made
it the more logical operator. Tandem-rotor helicopters demand type-specific pilot
conversion and rotor-system maintenance skills, and whether the NAF’s existing infrastructure
covers them was never established publicly.

## What Nigeria Has Added Since January

The wider air-power programme the January analysis described has moved on while 
the KV-107 question stood still. [Bell has begun building Nigeria’s first AH-1Z Viper attack helicopter](https://www.military.africa/2026/09/bell-begin-building-nigerias-ah-1z-attack-helicopters/),
the first of twelve covered by a Foreign Military Sales case that the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency [valued at an estimated US$997 million](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/09/2003602747/-1/-1/0/PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%20NIGERIA%2022-24%20CN.PDF)
when it notified Congress in April 2022. Businessday Nigeria notes that [a separate US$455 million production contract awarded to Bell in 2024](https://businessday.ng/news/article/will-fgs-997m-helicopter-buy-finally-tilt-the-security-balance/)
covers manufacture of the aircraft, so the headline figure buys a capability rather
than twelve bare airframes.

The NAF has taken delivery of its Turkish T-129 ATAK attack helicopters in batches,
[the first two in November 2023](https://www.military.africa/2023/11/nigeria-takes-delivery-of-t-129-atak-helicopters-from-turkey/)
and [a second pair in October 2024](https://www.military.africa/2024/10/nigeria-takes-delivery-of-second-batch-of-t-129-atak/),
of an order for six. It [completed factory acceptance testing on the first three of 24 M-346FA fighter-attack jets](https://www.military.africa/2026/08/nigerian-air-force-completes-first-set-of-m-346fa-jets-for-delivery/)
between 29 June and 9 July 2026. On 15 September it [received three more AW109 Trekker B helicopters in Lagos](https://www.military.africa/2026/09/naf-bolsters-fleet-with-new-leonardo-and-airbus-helicopters/),
following two Airbus H125 utility helicopters, as part of a ten-aircraft order that
brings planned Trekker holdings to sixteen.

None of those platforms supplies the medium or heavy troop and cargo lift that the
KV-107 reports were meant to provide. The attack helicopters and the M-346FA add
firepower, and the AW109 and H125 are light utility types. The January analysis 
described Nigeria’s acquisitions as part of the military’s “Golden Era” of fleet
expansion. On the evidence so far, the lift gap sits outside that expansion.

## Military Uniforms for Global Markets: Why Cultural Understanding Matters

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/military-uniforms-for-global-markets-why-cultural-understanding-matters/
- Published: 2026-10-10T10:55:18+01:00
- Author: Eray Yükseloğlu

In the global defence industry, international trade is often discussed in terms 
of production, logistics, and overall efficiency. Yet, after years of navigating
international export, I have come to recognise a fundamental truth: a military or
police uniform is never just a commercial product. It is a nation’s pride, its sovereignty,
and the daily protective shield of the heroes who stand guard at its borders. Therefore,
the true secret to supplying uniforms globally does not lie solely within the advanced
machinery of our factories. It lies in our ability to deeply understand and respect
the unique cultures of the nations we serve.

## Understanding the Soul of a Nation

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-scaled.
gif?resize=789%2C600&ssl=1)

_During our official visit and meetings with partners in Chile, Latin America._

Every market we enter possesses its own unique soul, shaped by history, climate,
and the character of its people. During my travels across different continents, 
whether engaging with our valued partners across the vibrant landscapes of Africa
or establishing commercial bridges across the dynamic markets of Latin America, 
I have treated every journey not merely as a commercial opportunity, but as a lesson
in cultural appreciation.

When a country entrusts you with its uniforms, it is placing their national pride
in your hands. Most exporters make the mistake of treating a procurement file as
a simple checklist. To me, it is a psychological map. The physical layout reveals
exactly how the state intends its authority to be projected. If you only look at
the fabric, you get a limited view. By understanding these unspoken cultural details,
you can reflect their identity in a way that goes beyond production capacity alone.

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-scaled.
jpg?resize=800%2C589&ssl=1)

_From our regional journeys and institutional coordination across Africa._

## Building Trust Like a Fortress

In our business philosophy at Raff Military Textile, we view international trade
through deep-rooted relationships rather than temporary commercial transactions.
A reliable defence supplier must stand as an unwavering pillar behind the defence
forces it equips.

This level of trust can only be forged when you show genuine reverence for a client’s
national heritage. We experienced this deeply during our previous visits and international
expos, where we meticulously recreated historical military uniforms to honour the
sacrifice of our ancestors. Exhibiting that noble spirit taught us a timeless lesson:
a nation’s military heritage is sacred. When we design garments for other nations,
we approach their history with that exact same reverence. Material success is fleeting,
but leaving behind an honest name, an unshakable character, and a reputation for
absolute reliability is the greatest legacy we can build in global trade.

## A Vision Expanded, A Heritage Honoured

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-scaled.
jpeg?resize=800%2C533&ssl=1)

_At our Raff Military Textile stand during the SAHA Expo in Istanbul._

Engaging with different nations teaches you adaptability, patience, and the art 
of listening. However, the more I travel on a global scale, the deeper I understand
the unique value, warmth, and potential of our own country. No matter how many borders
we cross or how many cultures we adapt to, our roots remain our ultimate anchor.

We carry the strength of our own history and the warmth of our homeland into every
international relationship. By remaining deeply loyal to our own values while remaining
intensely curious about the cultures of the world, we bridge continents. Ultimately,
global export is not just about shipping cargo across oceans; it is about building
a bridge of mutual respect, understanding the heartbeat of different nations, and
continuing to weave the future with the strength we derive from our shared human
heritage.

## AFRICA STOOD TALL: AAD 2026 Showcased Continental Capability As Attention Turns To 2028. S

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/africa-stood-tall-aad-2026-showcased-continental-capability-as-attention-turns-to-2028/
- Published: 2026-10-09T20:31:57+01:00
- Author: Military Africa

The 13th edition of Africa Aerospace and Defence (AAD) came to a spectacular close
at Air Force Base Waterkloof in Centurion on 20 September, capping five days that
confirmed the event’s standing as the continent’s premier aerospace and defence 
platform.

AAD 2026 hosted 52 official delegations from 28 countries and 10 national pavilions,
with 287 exhibitors from 33 countries and 27 382 trade visitors. The event reached
12 000 learners through the AAD Youth Foundation, while 55 843 members of the public
attended the air show. Addressing the media at the close of the event, Minister 
of Defence and Military Veterans Angie Motshekga said: “This week Africa stood tall
and we have every reason to.

Governments, industry leaders, innovators and young talent came together, and African
capability took its place among the best in the world. We are proud of what our 
continent builds, proud of the people who build it and proud to welcome the world
to see it.” The Minister officially launched AAD 2028, which will take place from
27 September to 1 October 2028, with the Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Association(
AMD) as lead partner.

“Bring your boldest technologies and your sharpest ideas, because in 2028, Africa
will once again open its skies to the world.” said Minister Motshekga. Over the 
two air show days, attention shifted to the skies as South African pilots, engineers
and aviation professionals showcased the country’s aviation and defence capabilities.
Families travelled from across the country, many of them first-time visitors. “We
are delighted to be here as a family.

This event is exciting and well organised,” said Heinrich Lourens from Secunda in
Mpumalanga. For thousands of young people, the event offered a first-hand look at
the technology and expertise behind the aerospace industry, and a glimpse of the
careers it holds. “It is a beautiful and amazing atmosphere to see South Africans
united and celebrating the work of the army together,” said Trisha Naicker from 
Pretoria, who attended with her son.

## Ukrainian drone teams operate in African Countries

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/ukrainian-drone-teams-operate-in-african-countries/
- Published: 2026-10-09T07:17:28+01:00
- Author: Camila

Ukrainian military intelligence [has sent drone specialists to Mali, Libya and Sudan](https://www.unmanned.africa/ukraine-extends-drone-war-into-africas-deserts-cnn-investigation-finds/)
to help local forces fight Russian troops and their proxies. The report draws on
interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and officers involved in the missions. It places
about 15 operators in northern Mali, a naval drone effort in Libya, and several 
specialists in Sudan.

The [Mali contingent works with the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA),](https://www.military.africa/2024/07/ukraine-provided-intel-to-malis-tuareg-rebels-that-killed-soldiers/)
a Tuareg-led separatist coalition that fights Mali’s military government and[ Russia’s Africa Corps](https://www.military.africa/tag/africa-corps/),
the state-run successor to the Wagner Group. One operator told CNN he receives a
drone’s video feed over the internet and radios back where to fly.

A Ukrainian Defence Intelligence source said troops from Chad, Niger, and Burkina
Faso earlier travelled to Mali for drone training. The reporting reviewed shows 
no confirmation from those governments. The FLA and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-
Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, [launched coordinated attacks on 25 April 2026](https://www.military.africa/2025/02/the-rise-of-drone-warfare-insurgents-and-terrorists-in-africa/).
A car bomb killed Mali’s defence minister, General Sadio Camara, at his home in 
Kati, about 15 kilometers north of Bamako. The FLA then took Kidal in the north 
and said it had agreed terms letting Africa Corps fighters leave a camp outside 
the city. Mali’s army said at the time that operations there were continuing.

A Ukrainian operator [revealed ](https://www.military.africa/2024/03/ukraine-strikes-russian-interests-in-sudan-with-covert-drone-operation/)
that his unit assisted the rebels during the Kidal fight. Ukraine’s link to the 
Tuareg dates to at least July 2024, when rebels ambushed Wagner and Malian troops
near Tinzaouaten; Kyiv later denied giving substantial help.

The Libyan operation adds a maritime element. A Ukrainian naval drone operator also
said his unit has used the international military base in Misrata since late 2025
to attack Russia’s “shadow fleet”, the ageing tankers Moscow uses to move sanctioned
oil. In return, the Ukrainians train Libyan forces. French public broadcaster, Radio
France Internationale (RFI), reported that more than 200 Ukrainian officers and 
technical specialists work at 3 sites in western Libya with the approval of the 
Tripoli government. RFI said some are based at the Air Force Academy in Misrata.
It also linked the group to the March strike on the Russian gas carrier Arctic Metagaz
east of Malta.

If both counts hold, the Libya footprint is roughly 13 times the size of the Mali
team. The craft involved are uncrewed surface vessels, small boats packed with explosives
and steered remotely. They are cheap next to the tankers and gas carriers they target,
which is why Kyiv has invested in them. Their range and reliability depend on the
launch point, and a base in western Libya puts the central Mediterranean within 
reach.

Fishermen found an armed naval drone, about six meters long, off the Greek island
of Lefkada on 7 May. The island lies more than 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian
coast. Greek authorities destroyed a 100-kilogram explosive charge on board. Greece
lodged a formal protest on 3 June, and Kyiv apologized on 6 June, citing circumstances
created by Russia’s aggression. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry had earlier said it had
no evidence the vessel belonged to Ukrainian operators. Media reports tie the craft
to Libya-based launches.

CNN first reported Ukrainian-linked drone activity in Sudan in 2023, when strikes
near Khartoum hit a Wagner-backed militia. The footage showed 2 commercial drone
types widely used by Ukrainian forces, with Ukrainian text on a controller. A Ukrainian
source then told CNN that Ukrainian special services were likely responsible.

A Ukrainian source also said the missions let units test equipment in extreme heat,
dust and long supply lines that the war in Ukraine has not imposed. Ukrainian teams
have also visited at least 5 Middle Eastern countries [this year to train local forces against Shahed drones](https://www.military.africa/2026/08/first-confirmed-deployment-of-shahed-136-drones-by-malian-forces/),
the Iranian-designed type Russia fires at Ukrainian cities.

Kyiv is turning battlefield experience into a foreign policy tool. “It puts pressure
on them. This whole story has both psychological and real results”. Remote coordination
keeps operators out of harm’s way but depends on stable data links and on partners
who can fly the drones. A Libyan base gives Ukrainian naval drones access to the
central Mediterranean, far beyond the reach of launches from Ukraine’s own coast,
where Russian tankers and gas carriers pass. The Lefkada incident shows the risk:
a craft that drifts loose becomes a diplomatic problem for Kyiv.

Moscow is already answering in public. Dmitry Polyansky, Russia’s deputy representative
at the United Nations, and others accused Ukrainian pilots in late August of aiding
terrorist-designated groups in Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad and
the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Tripoli and the FLA have yet to acknowledge Ukrainian help on the record, and any
Russian retaliation against those hosts would test how far the arrangements hold.
Further scrutiny from Greece and other Mediterranean states is likely if another
naval drone goes astray.

## Nigeria, Czech discuss ammunition production, Skyfox and L-410NG buy

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/nigeria-czech-discuss-ammunition-production-skyfox-and-l-410ng-buy/
- Published: 2026-10-08T10:48:36+01:00
- Author: Israel Chukwuma

On September 20, 2026, during an official 3-day visit to Ostrava, which encompassed
participation in the Czech Air Force Days and Defence Exhibition, Nigeria’s Minister
of State for Defence, Bello Muhammed Matawalle, formally requested the Czech Republic’s
assistance in establishing an ammunition production line with the Defence Industries
Corporation of Nigeria (DICON).

Minister Matawalle articulated this request during a bilateral meeting with his 
Czech counterpart, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Lt. Gen. (Rtd.)
Jaromír Zuna. The meeting took place alongside the air show at Leoš Janáček Airport
in Ostrava. The event, its 26th iteration, took place from September 19 to 20, 2026,
attracting aviation assets and delegations from various NATO member states. According
to a statement from the Ministry of Defence’s Chief Information Officer, Queeneth
Iheoma-Hart, Minister Matawalle headed a delegation comprising senior officials 
from the Ministry, DICON, and the National Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure(
NASENI).

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/nigeria-and-
czech-defence-industry-partners-2-1.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/nigeria-and-
czech-defence-industry-partners-1.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/nigeria-and-
czech-defence-industry-1.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&ssl=1)

The Minister held a bilateral meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence of the Czech Republic, Lieutenant General Jaromír Zuna (Rtd), with discussions
focused on strengthening the existing strategic partnership between both countries.

The delegation inspected the exhibition floor, where Czech manufacturers showcased
armored vehicles, air defense systems, and other defense material, before the two
ministers deliberated on enhanced industrial cooperation. Minister Zuna informed
the delegation that the Czech Republic is prepared to support DICON’s production
objectives and facilitate the transfer of relevant manufacturing technology. He 
extended a welcome for the visit and expressed commitment to ongoing collaboration.

This request for an ammunition production line is directly aligned with Nigeria’s
ongoing initiative to revitalize DICON, a state-owned arms manufacturer established
in 1964, which has experienced prolonged periods of operational underutilization.
A legislative act enacted in [2023, the DICON Act](https://www.military.africa/2023/11/nigeria-signs-dicon-bill-boosts-defence-industry/),
gave the corporation broader authority to regulate the country’s defense-industrial
sector and seek both domestic and foreign partners. Matawalle has cited the law 
repeatedly as the legal basis for channeling military procurement toward local manufacturing
rather than imports.

The corporation supplied about 4 million rounds to the Nigerian Army in January 
2024, after resuming ammunition production. By mid-2026, Matawalle set the corporation’s
ambition at 300 million rounds a year, and a separate joint venture, [DICON-D7G](https://www.military.africa/2025/05/dicon-partners-d7g-to-ramp-up-arms-production/),
has said it is targeting 60 million rounds annually while also assembling a licensed
version of the Kalashnikov AK-103 rifle, designated the [DG-103](https://www.military.africa/2025/11/nigerias-dicon-d7g-delivers-first-dg-103-rifle-batch-as-production-ramp-up/).
Ahead of the Africa International Defence Exhibition set for October 26-29, 2026,
in Lagos, DICON’s director-general, Major General Babatunde Ibrahim Alaya, said 
the corporation aims to add 30 million rounds of its own and to begin producing 
gunpowder domestically by August 2026 under a [memorandum of understanding (MoU)](https://www.military.africa/2026/08/dicon-partners-with-eagle-international-for-defence-systems/)
with an international partner.

Beyond the ammunition line, Matawalle and Zuna also discussed technology transfer
for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other military equipment, an area where 
DICON has limited existing capability. Czech industry has export experience in light
aircraft, armored vehicles and small arms that could map onto Nigeria’s stated priorities.

The Czech trip is one stop in a pattern of outreach by Nigeria’s defense ministry
this year. In mid-August 2026, Matawalle led a delegation to Egypt for a 2-day visit
aimed at joint arms production and a similar push for a domestic ammunition line.
On August 19, 2025, then-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hasan Bala Abubakar,
hosted Czech Junior Deputy Minister of Defence Radka Konderlová in Abuja, a meeting
that laid some of the groundwork for the current [defense-industrial](https://www.military.africa/2025/08/nigerian-air-force-czech-republic-strengthen-defence-ties/)
dialogue between the two countries.

> [Nigerian Air Force eyes Czech L-39NG jets for future upgrade](https://www.military.africa/2023/12/nigerian-air-force-eyes-czech-l-39ng-jets-for-future-upgrade/)

Czech-Nigerian defense ties also run through [aviation](https://www.military.africa/2026/03/nigerian-air-force-pursues-l-39-skyfox-for-advanced-pilot-training/)
maintenance. Czech manufacturer Aero Vodochody reactivated 3 Nigerian Air Force[ L-39ZA Albatross](https://www.military.africa/2019/06/aerovodochody-reactivates-three-nigerian-l-39za-albatross-in-country/)
light attack and trainer jets in-country in 2019, and 2 [more aircraft ](https://www.military.africa/2020/12/naf-reactivates-additional-l-39za-aircraft-in-country/)
underwent life-extension work in December 2020, adding to the pool of airframes 
Nigeria can put into service. That history gives the relationship a practical base
beyond the current round of talks, since Aero Vodochody already has technicians 
and parts experience specific to Nigeria’s existing fleet.

As part of the working visit, Matawalle scheduled to toured several Czech defense
and security industrial complexes to examine manufacturing processes firsthand, 
the ministry said. For DICON, the appeal of a Czech partnership lies less in scale
than in specialization. Czech firms are not among the world’s largest arms exporters,
but they carry deep experience in light weapons, ammunition components and trainer
aircraft.

The discussions coincided with the NATO Days in Ostrava & Czech Air Force Days, 
held at Leoš Janáček Ostrava Airport on September 19 and 20. The event brought together
Czech and international military units and defense companies for static and flying
demonstrations. 

During the visit, Matawalle’s delegation inspected Czech aerospace and defense products
including the Aero Vodochody L-39 Skyfox and the Aircraft Industries L-410NG, according
to Voice of Nigeria.

The delegation also visited displays involving Colt CZ Group and MESIT, with discussions
covering small arms, ammunition, tactical communications and other defense technologies.
Matawalle subsequently met senior Czech military leaders, including Chief of the
General Staff Lieutenant General **Miroslav Hlaváč**, Land Forces Commander Major
General **Josef Trojánek**, and Air Force Commander Brigadier General **Petr Tománek**.
Their current positions are independently confirmed by the Czech Ministry of Defence.

Those meetings covered training, maintenance and potential access to more advanced
military systems, according to the Nigerian report. No procurement agreement emerged
from the meetings.

## Skyfox Interest Builds on a Long-Standing Aviation Relationship

The L-39 Skyfox appearance is particularly relevant because Nigeria already has 
a long-standing relationship with Aero Vodochody. The Nigerian Air Force has operated
Czech-built L-39 aircraft since the 1980s. In 2020, Aero Vodochody worked with Nigerian
Air Force engineers and technicians on the in-country reactivation and life-extension
of L-39ZA aircraft at the 403 Flying Training School in Kano. 

In November 2024, the Nigerian Air Force disclosed that Aero had submitted proposals
covering reactivation, upgrades and eventually, the [potential acquisition of the L-39 Next Generation](https://www.military.africa/2026/03/nigerian-air-force-pursues-l-39-skyfox-for-advanced-pilot-training/).
That aircraft has since adopted the commercial name L-39 Skyfox. Aero describes 
the current [Skyfox ](https://www.military.africa/2025/07/aero-markets-its-skyfox-to-african-air-forces/)
as a subsonic jet trainer and tactical aircraft capable of advanced flight and tactical
training, reconnaissance, air patrol and light-attack missions.

The dialogue continued in December 2025, when the Nigerian Air Force hosted a Czech
delegation including Aero Vodochody. Discussions then covered the future of Nigeria’s
L-39 fleet, the L-410NG, surveillance technologies, UAV solutions for border security
and specialized training.  The September 2026 inspection of the Skyfox and L-410NG
therefore continues an existing series of discussions rather than marking the beginning
of a new relationship.

## Kenyan and U.S. Forces complete first joint Base Defense Exercise

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/kenyan-and-u-s-forces-complete-first-joint-base-defense-exercise/
- Published: 2026-10-08T10:12:22+01:00
- Author: Israel Chukwuma

On 27 August 2026, Kenyan and US forces held their first combined, installation-
wide base defence exercise (BDEX) at Manda Bay military facility in Kenya. The drill
covered the whole coastal facility and drew in personnel from every branch of the
Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). The U.S. military described it as the first complete
cross-functional integration of combined forces at the site. Manda Bay sits on the
Kenyan coast near the Somali border, and it supports counter-terrorism operations
across East Africa.

A base defence exercise (BDEX) checks how a[ facility](https://www.military.africa/2026/07/kenya-launches-commando-cqb-training-facility-at-mtongwe/)
detects, assesses, and responds to an attack. Commanders use it to find gaps before
an enemy does. Planners ran several scenarios. Teams practiced emergency response
and recovery, drills for suspicious people and activity, and mortar counterfire.
Counterfire means locating the point where enemy mortar rounds are fired from and
responding quickly. Photos released with the story show KDF personnel escorting 
a simulated suspect to a holding area and giving simulated medical aid to a US airman.
A US explosive ordnance disposal team leader, Master Sgt. Brian Jones, operated 
a bomb-disposal robot.

The two forces use different standard operating procedures, the written routines
that govern who does what during an incident. US Army Sgt. 1st Class Christian Wheeler,
who handles security force operations for Task Force Seminole, said the drill let
soldiers and airmen work with partners they had never trained alongside. “We both
want the same thing: the protection of this area, of Kenya, and to defeat the enemy”,
he said.

Lt. Col. Sandy Van den Mooter, commander of the 475th Air Expeditionary Base Squadron,
said the partnership shows up daily in coordination meetings and knowledge exchanges.
He said the BDEX is a step toward more complex combined training. His squadron supports
KDF efforts against al-Shabaab and other extremist groups.

Manda Bay sits on Kenya’s northern coast near the Somali border. The US military
uses it to support counter-terrorism operations across East Africa, and AFRICOM 
describes the exercise as part of keeping that reach intact. Al-Shabaab attacked
the airfield in January 2020, killing 3 Americans and destroying aircraft. In May
2024, President William Ruto signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) in Washington
to expand the Manda Bay airfield.

The exercise also fits a longer pattern of US-Kenyan military ties. In September
2023, the two governments signed a [5-year](https://www.military.africa/2023/09/us-kenya-enters-five-year-defence-cooperation-agreement/)
defence cooperation agreement. Washington has supplied Kenya with six [MD 530F](https://www.military.africa/2022/02/kenya-push-for-additional-md-530f-helicopters-from-the-us/)
light attack helicopters, delivered in [2020](https://www.military.africa/2020/01/kenya-defence-forces-induct-md-530f-helicopters/),
along with [12 Bastion armoured](https://www.military.africa/2018/12/us-donates-12-bastion-armoured-personnel-carriers-to-the-kenya-defence-forces-kdf/)
personnel carriers in 2018 and [Metal Shark patrol boats](https://www.military.africa/2018/03/us-donates-metal-shark-patrol-boats-to-the-kenyan-navy/)
in 2017. In 2024, it sent more [MaxxPro](https://www.military.africa/2024/09/us-to-deliver-maxxpro-armoured-vehicles-to-kenyan-forces-in-haiti/)
mine-resistant vehicles for Kenyan troops deployed in Haiti.

In March 2026, the two countries opened a marine range and [close-quarters battle complex](https://www.military.africa/2026/07/kenya-launches-commando-cqb-training-facility-at-mtongwe/)
at Kenya Navy Base Mtongwe in Mombasa County. AFRICOM’s [Justified Accord](https://www.military.africa/2026/03/exercise-justified-accord-2026-the-largest-multinational-excercise-in-east-africa-ends/)
2026 exercise, which ran from February 23 through March 13, 2026, also ran partly
in Kenya. Gen. Dagvin Anderson, who took command of AFRICOM in August 2025, made
Kenya his first stop on the continent, [visiting](https://www.military.africa/2025/09/new-africom-commander-visits-kenyan-defence-hq/)
Nairobi in September of that year. The exercise also gives Kenyan and U.S. planners
a list of coordination gaps to fix, which is the point of a first drill.

## Phoenix Express 2026: Tunisia wraps up maritime exercise

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/phoenix-express-2026-tunisia-wraps-up-maritime-exercise/
- Published: 2026-10-08T09:37:08+01:00
- Author: Israel Chukwuma

The 21st iteration of Exercise Phoenix Express concluded on September 18, 2026, 
at La Goulette Naval Base in Tunisia. A 12-day multinational maritime exercise, 
led by the United States (US) 6th Fleet and hosted by the Tunisian Navy.

Phoenix Express is one of three regional maritime exercises run by US Naval Forces
Africa (NAVAF), the component of US Africa Command (Africom) responsible for naval
operations on the continent. This year’s exercise opened on September 7 and ran 
in two week-long phases: an in-port, land-based command phase, and a follow-on phase
at sea.

During the in-port stage, participating navies used a multinational communication
center to coordinate and pass real-time data, building what planners call a common
operational picture, a shared, updated view of vessel movements and activity across
the exercise area. The at-sea phase put that coordination into practice through 
search-and-rescue drills and simulated ship boardings meant to sharpen interdiction
procedures among the different fleets.

Thirteen (13) nations took part: Algeria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Georgia, Italy,
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Spain and the US. Earlier Africom
material published at the start of the exercise had listed a slightly different 
lineup, including the United Kingdom rather than Saudi Arabia and Spain; the closing
release from US Naval Forces Europe and Africa reflects the final roster of participants
who saw the exercise through to completion. Vice Admiral J.T. Anderson, commander
of US 6th Fleet and NATO’s Naval Striking and Support Forces, framed the exercise
around the pairing of technology and training. “The true strength of Phoenix Express
lies in combining cutting-edge maritime technologies with the exceptional professionalism
of the forces who operate them”, he said in a statement issued as the exercise began.
At the closing ceremony, Anderson credited the participating crews with proving 
that shared interests, not fleet size, hold the coalition together, and US Ambassador
to Tunisia Bill Bazzi pointed to the exercise as evidence that a stable Mediterranean
benefits both countries directly.

Phoenix Express traces back to 2004, when the US Navy began building a standing 
maritime security partnership with Tunisia that has run, with one interruption, 
ever since; the 2020 edition was cancelled due to the [COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.military.africa/2020/03/covid-19-phoenix-express-african-lion-obangame-2020-exercise-canceled/).
The 16th iteration, Exercise Phoenix Express 2021, of the North African maritime
security series, [was held](https://www.military.africa/2021/05/exercise-phoenix-express-2021-starts-in-tunisia/)
on May 17, 2021, in Tunis, Tunisia. The series grew out of the broader Africa Partnership
Station initiative and the wider “Express” family of exercises the US Navy uses 
to build maritime capacity with partner forces around the continent. What started
as a smaller bilateral and regional effort, with 9 African and 9 European nations
taking part as recently as 2010, has expanded to draw participants from well beyond
North Africa, including this year’s contingents from Georgia and Saudi Arabia.

The technical substance of Phoenix Express sits less in hardware and more in interoperability.
The exercise is built around getting different navies’ sensors, communications systems
and command structures to work together well enough to track vessels and coordinate
a response across national boundaries. Alongside Tunisian and other partner forces,
elements of the US 6th Fleet used the drill to expand their use of advanced tracking
and detection systems aimed at identifying illegal activity inside African exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), the waters extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastline
where a state holds special rights over resources.

Phoenix Express is one of three regional maritime exercises that US Naval Forces
Africa runs each year, alongside [Cutlass Express](https://www.military.africa/2026/02/19-nations-participate-in-exercise-cutlass-express-2026/)
in East Africa and [Obangame Express](https://www.military.africa/2026/04/obangame-express-2026-maritime-exercise-returns-to-cameroon/)
in the Gulf of Guinea. Together they form a standing effort to build partner navies’
capacity through repetition rather than a single large show of force, an approach
that has defined much of Africom’s maritime engagement since the command stood up
in 2007.

The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Georgia this year, alongside a steady core of 
North African and southern European participants, points to the exercise’s continued
use as a vehicle for widening security ties beyond the immediate Mediterranean basin.
It also comes against a backdrop of broader US naval engagement with Tunisia, a 
relationship Washington has repeatedly tied to a bilateral history stretching back
to a 1797 treaty of peace and friendship between the two countries. For the US and
NATO partners, it offers a foothold for maritime [security](https://www.military.africa/2026/06/tunisia-procures-military-equipment-for-border-security-from-the-u-s-state-department/)
cooperation in a region where illicit trafficking, irregular migration, and disputed
maritime boundaries remain persistent concerns.

## Somalia Graduates Its Largest Army Class Since 1991

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2026/10/somalia-graduates-its-largest-army-class-since-1991/
- Published: 2026-10-05T17:14:11+01:00
- Author: Ekene Lionel

The Somali National Army graduated roughly 3,000 soldiers at the Xananbuure training
camp in Galgaduud on 16 August 2026, the largest single cohort trained inside the
country since the central government collapsed in 1991. President Hassan Sheikh 
Mohamud presided over the ceremony, calling the milestone evidence of “the recovery
of statehood and the rebuilding of the Somali National Army.” The graduation was
funded by Saudi Arabia under a February 2026 military cooperation agreement committing
Riyadh to train up to 5,000 Somali recruits, with Saudi military representatives
overseeing part of the programme and attending the pass-out parade alongside senior
federal and regional Somali officials, including Galmudug President Ahmed Abdi Kariye,
known as Qoor-Qoor, and Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi.

The achievement is real and, on its own terms, genuinely significant for a country
that has spent three decades rebuilding a national army largely through foreign-
run training programmes abroad or scattered, smaller cohorts at home. It is also,
within weeks of the ceremony, at the centre of a regional controversy the celebratory
framing around the graduation did not anticipate.

## What Happened After the Graduation

On 1 September, Somalia’s National Security Adviser, Aways Haji Yusuf, confirmed
for the first time that an undisclosed number of soldiers from the Xananbuure cohort
had crossed into Ethiopia’s Somali Region. Yusuf described the movement as authorised
family leave, saying Mogadishu was aware of the troops’ presence across the border.
That explanation has not settled the matter. Conflicting reports have put the number
of soldiers involved anywhere between 180 and 900, and some accounts claimed the
group was detained before being transferred to Jigjiga, the regional capital, rather
than simply visiting relatives. The episode, now referred to in regional reporting
as the Jigjiga incident, landed in an already sensitive bilateral relationship: 
Somalia and Ethiopia have been at odds since Addis Ababa signed a preliminary agreement
with the breakaway region of Somaliland in January 2024 involving coastal land access
in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence, an arrangement
Mogadishu has condemned as a direct attack on its sovereignty.

A separate and more serious set of allegations has attached itself to the broader
Saudi-funded programme rather than to the Xananbuure graduates specifically. Kenyan
outlet **_The Standard_** reported in late July, before the August graduation, that
the programme involved more than 5,000 recruits trained by contractors from Romania,
Ukraine, South Africa and Colombia, and that some recruits were being prepared for
eventual deployment alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces in Sudan’s civil war.

Other regional reporting has placed total enrolment at 5,107 recruits across two
camps in the Guri El area, roughly 2,000 of them from the semi-autonomous Puntland
region, figures that broadly track with but do not precisely match the scale described
in official Somali statements. These allegations have not been confirmed by the 
Somali, Saudi or Sudanese governments, and should be read as credible but independently
unverified reporting rather than established fact.

## Why the Timing Matters

None of this changes the underlying strategic pressure driving Somalia to train 
soldiers at this scale in the first place. [Military Africa reported in July 2026](https://www.military.africa/2026/07/us-to-withdraw-un-support-for-au-mission-in-somalia/)
that the United States had informed the African Union it would block renewal of 
United Nations logistical support for the African Union Support and Stabilization
Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) once the mission’s current mandate expires at the end
of 2026, a deadline that places heavy pressure on the Somali National Army to build
independent capacity quickly. AUSSOM, which succeeded the African Union Transition
Mission in Somalia on 1 January 2025 and traces its lineage back to the original
African Union Mission in Somalia established in 2007, currently deploys close to
11,826 uniformed personnel across roughly 400,000 square kilometres of south-central
Somalia. Every soldier Mogadishu trains domestically is, in principle, one fewer
the country will need an international partner to supply once that funding cliff
arrives.

## A Reconstruction Effort With Many Foreign Hands

The Xananbuure graduation is the latest entry in a Somali military reconstruction
effort that has drawn in an unusually wide spread of foreign partners over the past
several years, each filling a different gap. Turkey’s role remains the most institutionally
embedded. [Camp TURKSOM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_TURKSOM), Turkey’s largest
overseas military base, opened in Mogadishu in September 2017 at a reported cost
of roughly 50 million US dollars and has since trained thousands of Somali personnel,
including the elite Gorgor commando force. [Military Africa reported in April 2026](https://www.military.africa/2026/04/flyover-of-turkish-f-16s-during-somali-anniversary/)
that Turkish instructors had expanded Gorgor training to include heavy armour and
main battle tanks, centred on the M48A5T2, a Turkish-modernised variant of the American
Patton tank fitted with a 750-horsepower Continental twin-turbo diesel engine giving
the 45-tonne vehicle a road speed of 48 kilometres per hour and a range of 499 kilometres,
a shift from asymmetric counter-insurgency training toward conventional armoured
manoeuvre warfare. Turkey separately [delivered ](https://www.military.africa/2025/06/somalia-receives-turkish-t-129-atak-combat-helicopters/)
three T-129 Atak attack helicopters and two utility helicopters in 2025, following
a [10-year bilateral defence agreement signed](https://www.military.africa/2024/02/turkey-and-somalia-sign-defence-and-economic-pact/)
by Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and his Somali counterpart, Abdulkadir Mohamed
Nur, and [began construction of a rocket and space-technology testing facility in Somalia](https://www.military.africa/2024/12/turkey-commences-rocket-launch-facility-in-somalia/)
in December 2024.

Egypt has moved quickly to establish its own footprint. [Military Africa reported in February 2026](https://www.military.africa/2026/02/turkey-egypt-expands-military-presence-in-somalia/)
that Egyptian forces were formally deployed into the AUSSOM framework following 
a parade in Cairo attended by President Mohamud, extending a relationship that began
with a defence agreement in August 2024 and Egypt’s first military aid delivery 
to Somalia in more than four decades the following month, a move widely read as 
a response to Ethiopia’s Somaliland arrangement and the resulting three-way tension
between Cairo, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. Italy contributed four Bell 412EPX helicopters
worth 16 million US dollars in 2024, described at the time as the largest single
delivery since the lifting of Somalia’s arms embargo, while the African Union [supplied ](https://www.military.africa/2025/05/somalia-receives-chinese-tiger-armoured-vehicles-from-african-union/)
Chinese-made ZFB-05 Xinxing armoured vehicles and logistics equipment ahead of the
AUSSOM transition in March 2025. [The United States resumed training for Somalia’s elite Danab Brigade](https://www.military.africa/2026/06/us-restarts-somalian-danab-commando-training/)
at Ballidoogle airbase in June 2026, restarting a programme suspended after a 2023
ration-diversion scandal in which US-funded food meant for Danab troops was diverted
and resold, an episode that prompted detentions within the unit and a US pledge 
to build stronger accountability safeguards before resuming support.

## A Milestone

Somalia’s government is right that training 3,000 soldiers inside the country, rather
than sending them abroad, represents genuine institutional progress after more than
three decades of conflict. But the Xananbuure graduation cannot currently be reported
as an unambiguous success story. A still-unresolved cross-border incident involving
graduates from the same cohort, credible but unconfirmed allegations that the wider
Saudi-funded programme may feed recruits into Sudan’s civil war, and persistent 
analyst warnings about soldier pay, retention and frontline ammunition supply networks
all sit alongside the achievement Mohamud celebrated in August. Whether the programme
ultimately strengthens Somalia’s own army or becomes entangled in conflicts well
beyond its borders is a question that, as of this writing, remains open.