# RSF shoots down Sudan’s third Akinci drone

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2025/09/rsf-shoots-down-sudans-third-akinci-drone/
- Published: 2025-09-13T13:10:05+01:00
- Author: Military Africa

In the ongoing civil war that has ravaged Sudan since April 2023, the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF) have achieved another milestone in their efforts to contest the Sudanese
Armed Forces’ (SAF) dominance of the skies. On September 13, 2025, RSF air defences
brought down a third Baykar Bayraktar Akinci high-altitude long-endurance unmanned
combat aerial vehicle (HALE UCAV) over Al Khoei town in West Kordofan.

This event, verified through wreckage analysis, marks a pattern of successes for
the RSF against one of the SAF’s most advanced assets. Images of the debris show
distinctive elements like the nosecone, fuselage sections, wings, and control panels
that match the Akinci’s design, leaving little doubt about the aircraft’s identity.
The downing points to the RSF’s deployment of upgraded air defence systems in this
region, which had previously seen less intense aerial activity compared to Darfur
hotspots.

This latest incident builds on two prior victories that have eroded the SAF’s aerial
advantage. The first Akinci [fell on July 10, 2025](https://www.military.africa/2025/07/akinci-drone-downed-in-sudan/),
over El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, amid a fierce RSF push to capture the
city. According to RSF statements, the drone had conducted multiple airstrikes that
hit civilian infrastructure, including homes, medical facilities, schools, and displacement
camps in areas such as Zamzam, Kuma, and Mellit. RSF spokesperson Al-Fateh Qarashi
described the strikes as indiscriminate, emphasising the human cost to non-combatants
caught in the crossfire. RSF forces engaged the UCAV with anti-aircraft fire, forcing
it to crash and disrupting SAF operations in the besieged area, where ground fighting
has persisted since mid-May 2024.

![Sudan loses akinci drone](https://www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2025/
09/sudan-loses-akinci-drone-3-1024x486.jpeg)

![Sudan loses akinci drone](https://www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2025/
09/sudan-loses-akinci-drone-2-1024x486.jpeg)

![Sudan loses akinci drone](https://www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2025/
09/sudan-loses-akinci-drone-1-473x1024.jpeg)

Just days before the third downing, in early September 2025, [RSF commanders reported neutralising a second Akinci](https://www.military.africa/2025/09/sudan-rebels-shoot-down-another-akinci-drone/)
after it bombed the Manawashi market in South Darfur. The strike killed at least
two people—a civilian woman and an RSF fighter—while wounding a market worker and
another woman, both of whom needed urgent medical care. Witnesses speaking to local
media outlets recounted the panic as people scrambled to aid the injured amid the
rubble. RSF anti-aircraft units then targeted the drone, setting it ablaze in flight
before it crashed into a residential area in Mershing, about 15 kilometres away.
Remarkably, the impact caused no further deaths or major damage, but the event underscored
the risks of urban warfare involving unmanned systems.

For the SAF, the Akinci has served as a cornerstone of their strategy to hold key
territories, especially in Darfur and Kordofan, where RSF advances threaten supply
lines and urban centres. These drones enable precise attacks on RSF artillery, convoys,
and bases in places like Nyala, El Fasher, Geneina, and various Kordofan locales,
allowing the military to project power without risking piloted aircraft. However,
the repeated losses signal a turning point; the RSF’s growing proficiency in countering
these platforms questions the long-term viability of the SAF’s reliance on unmanned
strikes to maintain battlefield superiority.

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The Baykar Bayraktar Akinci represents a leap in drone technology, tailored for 
demanding roles in asymmetric conflicts. Produced by the Turkish company Baykar,
which has ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s family through co-ownership by
his son-in-law, the Akinci measures 12.2 meters long with a 20-meter wingspan and
stands 4.1 meters tall. It handles a maximum takeoff weight of 6,000 kilograms and
can carry up to 1,350 kilograms of ordnance, sensors, or electronic warfare gear.
Dual engines propel it to speeds of 361 kilometres per hour at maximum, with a cruising
pace of 280 kilometres per hour. Capable of reaching 40,000 feet in altitude—though
it typically operates around 30,000 feet—the drone’s range stretches beyond 7,500
kilometres, supported by endurance exceeding 24 hours for persistent surveillance
or loitering strikes.

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Engineered for reliability in hostile settings, the Akinci incorporates triple-redundant
flight controls and fault-tolerant systems to withstand failures. Satellite communications
enable operations far from ground stations, while its design includes low-observable
features and electronic countermeasures to evade detection. In Sudan’s theatre, 
these attributes have allowed the SAF to execute missions that disrupt RSF logistics
and fortifications, often with precision-guided munitions that minimise collateral
damage if used judiciously. Yet, real-world combat exposes limitations; even with
these safeguards, the drone remains susceptible to well-coordinated ground fire,
particularly from radar-guided or infrared-seeking missiles that can lock onto its
heat signature or radar profile during attack runs.

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The RSF’s air defence evolution has been key to these intercepts. Early in the war,
they leaned on rudimentary weapons like 23mm and 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns, paired
with portable systems such as the Soviet SAM-7 or Chinese FN-6, which offered limited
range against high-flying targets. Over time, foreign support has transformed this
arsenal. Reports indicate the Russian Wagner Group [provided ](https://www.military.africa/2023/05/wagner-groups-supplying-surface-to-air-missiles-to-sudans-rapid-support-forces/)
surface-to-air missiles in 2023, as noted by U.S. Treasury sanctions, enhancing 
the RSF’s reach against drones and helicopters. Speculation surrounds the exact 
models—possibly advanced MANPADS or short-range batteries—but their impact is evident
in the Akinci downings. The UAE also [supplied ](https://www.military.africa/2025/07/uae-delivered-chinese-fk-2000-air-defense-systems-to-sudans-rsf/)
Chinese-made FK-2000 air defence system to Sudan’s RSF.

Further bolstering comes from alleged United Arab Emirates involvement, with evidence
from August 2025 showing Chinese-origin air defence systems reaching RSF hands, 
potentially violating global arms restrictions on Sudan. This influx has enabled
more integrated defences, combining radar for early warning with missiles for engagement,
shifting the aerial balance in contested zones. The UAE’s reported cooperation with
the RSF over recent months aimed specifically at countering the SAF’s Akinci operations,
though earlier attempts yielded few results until the string of successes in July
and September.

On the SAF side, drone acquisitions have involved covert international dealings.
A March 2025 Washington Post investigation, based on leaked records, revealed [Baykar’s $120 million sale of drones and munitions to Sudan](https://www.military.africa/2023/10/turkey-delivered-bayraktar-tb2-drones-to-sudan/)
in 2023, including at least eight TB2 models and 600 warheads. Routed through third
parties to evade U.S. and EU embargoes, these transfers may have included incentives
like access to Sudan’s gold and copper resources for Turkish firms. Baykar has remained
silent on the claims, while Turkey publicly advocates for peace talks.

Egypt has also [contributed](https://www.military.africa/2025/04/turkish-bayraktar-tb2-drone-instrumental-in-sudans-advances/),
delivering Bayraktar TB2 drones in October 2024 amid thawing Cairo-Ankara relations.
These have targeted RSF assets in el-Gezira and Khartoum states, such as convoys
near the Baka Bridge. In April 2025, a Turkish A400M aircraft arrived in Port Sudan,
likely ferrying more Akinci components or related gear, sustaining the SAF’s fleet
despite sanctions.

The RSF has not been passive; in May 2025, their own drone strikes on Port Sudan
hit facilities training SAF operators with Turkish specialists, injuring some who
were later repatriated. This tit-for-tat escalation highlights how both factions
leverage foreign tech to prolong the fight, complicating diplomatic efforts to end
the violence.

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