# Draken sue Denel over failed Cheetah deliveries

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2025/09/draken-sue-denel-over-failed-cheetah-deliveries/
- Published: 2025-09-04T13:03:38+01:00
- Author: Sarah Lesedi

On August 19, 2025, Draken International, a prominent player in adversary air training
services, filed a civil complaint in Florida’s Middle District Court against South
Africa’s state-owned defence firm Denel.

The lawsuit centres on a $35.2 million [contract for 12 Cheetah fighter jets](https://www.military.africa/2020/10/ex-saaf-cheetah-jet-restored-ready-to-join-draken-aggressors/)
that Denel largely failed to fulfil, despite multiple extensions and amendments.
Draken seeks a $7.1 million refund, additional damages, and interest, painting a
picture of prolonged delays, incomplete deliveries, and breached promises that have
left the American company out of pocket and short on assets. This case not only 
spotlights the perils of international arms procurement but also highlights the 
lingering effects of corruption and mismanagement within Denel, as documented in
South Africa’s Zondo Commission inquiries.

Draken International, often dubbed the world’s largest private air force, specialises
in providing tactical aviation services to military clients, including the United
States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Based in Lakeland, Florida, and owned 
by the private equity giant Blackstone, the company operates a diverse fleet of 
aircraft used for adversary training, where pilots simulate enemy threats to hone
combat skills. Their services extend to close air support, joint terminal attack
controller training, and advanced tactical exercises, filling a critical gap in 
military preparedness amid budget constraints on full-scale government fleets. Draken’s
interest in the Cheetah jets stemmed from their compatibility with existing assets,
such as the 22 modernised Mirage F1Ms acquired from Spain, which enhance realistic
training scenarios against fourth-generation fighters.

The Cheetah itself boasts a[ storied history rooted in South Africa’s apartheid-era arms development](https://www.military.africa/2018/02/newly-released-photos-gives-insight-on-the-south-african-made-cheetah/).
Developed in the 1980s by Atlas Aircraft Corporation, later absorbed into Denel,
the Cheetah emerged as a heavily upgraded variant of the French Dassault Mirage 
III. Facing international sanctions that limited access to new aircraft, South African
engineers incorporated Israeli Kfir influences, including a new nose design for 
improved avionics, canard foreplanes for better manoeuvrability, and the Snecma 
Atar 9K-50 engine capable of propelling the jet to Mach 2.2 speeds. The single-seat
Cheetah C variant measures 15.55 meters in length with an 8.22-meter wingspan, offering
a combat radius exceeding 1,300 kilometres and a service ceiling of 17,000 meters.
Armament options include air-to-air missiles like the V3C Darter, air-to-ground 
ordnance, and a 30mm DEFA cannon, making it a versatile multirole fighter. The dual-
seat Cheetah D served primarily for training, with similar specs but adapted for
instructor-pilot configurations.

South Africa retired its Cheetah fleet in 2008 after acquiring[ Saab Gripen jets](https://www.military.africa/2025/04/saaf-seeks-spares-for-major-aircraft/),
leaving the aircraft in storage at facilities like Air Force Base Makhado. Denel,
as the design authority, positioned itself as the go-to source for refurbishments
and sales. A notable prior transaction involved exporting 12 Cheetahs to Ecuador
in 2011, where they bolstered the Ecuadorian Air Force’s capabilities until phased
out in 2021 due to maintenance challenges. That deal, valued at around $78 million
including spares and training, demonstrated Denel’s potential in the secondary market
for legacy aircraft, but it also foreshadowed issues with post-sale support that
would later plague other customers.

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The Draken-Denel contract originated on October 31, 2017, with an initial $29.2 
million agreement for nine single-seat Cheetah C jets (serials 344, 345, 353, 361,
363, 369, 370, 375, 376) and three dual-seat Cheetah D models (845, 858, 859). The
package included return-to-service work, flight acceptance tests in South Africa,
and delivery to the United States, with a 24-month phased schedule. Draken paid 
a $500,000 good-faith deposit in December 2017 and a $9 million advance in March
2018, signalling confidence in Denel’s ability to deliver airworthy aircraft fitted
with specific ejection seats and other components.

However, progress stalled almost immediately. By September 2020, Denel had delivered
only two jets under Project Dragon—a single-seater and a dual-seater in October 
2019—both arriving late and deficient. Key issues included missing ejection seats,
incomplete avionics upgrades, and failure to meet airworthiness standards. Draken
alleged that these shortcomings necessitated amendments to the contract. The first,
on January 30, 2018, allowed Draken to source parts from third parties and deduct
costs from the purchase price, as Denel could not supply them. A second amendment
on October 6, 2020, raised the total price to $35.2 million and adjusted the delivery
timeline, by which point Draken had paid $12.8 million without receiving a single
fully compliant aircraft.

One more jet followed in mid-2021, but it too fell short of requirements, leading
to deferred deliveries and fruitless negotiations. Draken described Denel’s responses
as stalling tactics with pretextual obstacles, exacerbating damages from lost training
opportunities. The company emphasised granting ample extensions before resorting
to litigation, highlighting frustrations with Denel’s performance amid broader operational
turmoil.

Denel is the design authority of the Cheetah fighter that was locally developed 
as a variant of the Mirage III in the 1980s. The aircraft were retired from active
duty in 2008 following South Africa’s acquisition of its new fleet of Saab Gripen
fighter jets. Denel previously delivered 12 Cheetahs to the Ecuadorian Air Force,
in 2011.

Denel said that the Cheetahs, which can fly at Mach 2.2 and operate at ranges of
more than 1,300km, were the first South African–designed fighters added to Draken’s
inventory. Another aspect of Denel’s contract with Draken was that the aircraft 
must be delivered in airworthy condition and be fitted with specific ejection seats.

“Among other deficiencies, Denel failed to deliver the aircraft complete with ejection
seats”

On 30 January 2018, they amended the initial agreement to allow Draken to order 
certain parts from third parties other than Denel and discount the cost against 
the purchase price.

“This amendment was necessary given Denel’s failure to provide several of the additional
parts encompassed by the agreement,” Draken said.

On 6 October 2020, the parties amended the agreement again to adjust the phased 
delivery schedule for the remaining aircraft.

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“As part of the amendment, the parties agreed to amend the total purchase price 
for the twelve aircraft to $35,238,028 (R625 million),” Draken stated.

“By the time the parties executed the second amended agreement, Draken had paid 
a total of $12,783,333 (R227 million) without receiving a single aircraft in Airworthy
condition.” After this second amendment to the original agreement, Denel delivered
one additional aircraft, which Draken said also failed to meet several performance
and condition requirements.

“Given the extensive issues with Denel’s performance, the parties agreed to defer
further deliveries pending discussions of a potential resolution,” Draken said.

“Over the course of such discussions, Denel has repeatedly stalled and raised pretextual
hurdles to advancing the discussions.” Draken said this continued delay has only
aggravated the significant damages already caused by Denel’s failure to perform 
under the agreement.

Denel’s woes trace back to the state capture era under former President Jacob Zuma,
as exhaustively detailed in the Zondo Commission’s reports. Established in 1992 
as a consolidation of South Africa’s defence manufacturing assets, Denel once thrived
with innovations like the Rooivalk attack helicopter—a tandem-seat, twin-engine 
platform with anti-tank missiles and a 20mm cannon, deployed in UN peacekeeping 
missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo—and the G6 self-propelled howitzer,
a 155mm artillery system on a wheeled chassis that saw action in the Gulf War with
UAE forces. Revenue peaked at R8.2 billion in 2015-16, but plummeted to R2.4 billion
by 2019-20 amid corruption scandals.

The Zondo Commission, chaired by Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, uncovered how Gupta-
linked appointees hollowed out Denel through irregular contracts and board manipulations.
For instance, in 2015, then-Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown appointed Daniel
Mantsha as board chair, who allegedly facilitated deals favouring Gupta associates,
resulting in R3.2 billion in irregular expenditure. This era saw a mass exodus of
skilled engineers to the UAE, accompanied by accusations of intellectual property
theft, further crippling production lines. By 2019-20, Denel reported a R1.96 billion
loss, with liabilities exceeding assets by R2.3 billion, rendering it technically
insolvent.

Real-world repercussions included salary delays in 2022, prompting trade union Solidarity
to secure a court order auctioning Denel assets for R90 million in back pay. Employees
faced withheld tax certificates despite deductions, eroding trust and accelerating
the brain drain. The COVID-19 pandemic compounded delays on the Cheetah project,
as did U.S. reductions in outsourced adversary training demand. Yet, Denel’s internal
chaos, as per Zondo findings, remained the core issue, with the commission recommending
prosecutions and reforms to prevent future capture.

Efforts to revive Denel have included a R9 billion bailout approved by late Minister
Pravin Gordhan, spread over five years. In February 2024, board chair Gloria Serobe
reported a R463 million net loss for 2023, 37% worse than forecasted, and the Auditor-
General issued a disclaimer on financials. By February 2025, updated statements 
were still absent from parliamentary oversight. Denel has vowed to oppose the lawsuit,
asserting commitment to obligations while declining to comment on the merits. Recent
activities, such as a 2025 MoU with Brazil’s Embraer for KC-390 cooperation and 
participation in Abu Dhabi’s IDEX exhibition, suggest attempts at recovery, but 
financial opacity persists.

The Draken lawsuit also resonates on social media, with recent X posts amplifying
the story. One user noted Denel’s R124 million exposure, linking it to broader economic
woes in South Africa. Another highlighted the failure to deliver nine jets, framing
it as a symptom of post-state capture decay. Defence analyst Darren Olivier tweeted
about the $7 million claim, emphasising Denel’s delivery shortfalls. These discussions
underscore public scrutiny of state-owned enterprises.

Looking ahead, the case could strain South Africa’s defence exports, which have 
already been diminished from Denel’s heyday, when it supplied G5 howitzers to Iraq
in the 1980s or Umkhonto missiles to Algeria in the 2000s. Recovery hinges on transparency
and reforms, as Zondo recommended. For Draken, pursuing litigation in U.S. courts
leverages jurisdiction over international contracts, potentially setting precedents
for enforcing deals with troubled suppliers.

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