# Drones in the Sudanese War

- Link: https://www.military.africa/2025/06/drones-in-the-sudanese-war/
- Published: 2025-06-18T08:51:39+01:00
- Author: Albadawi Rahmtall

Since the entry of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of various types—short and long-
range, whether for reconnaissance, attack, or suicide missions—into the battlefield,
they have posed a critical operational challenge to ground forces, especially regarding
the protection of vital and strategic sites. This fundamental shift, like conflict,
has forced military actors to reassess their air defence strategies and their ability
to withstand the low-cost, high-tech airborne threat.

In the Sudanese context, the conflict has increasingly morphed into an aerial warfare
domain, particularly following the operational [disintegration](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/22/sudans-army-seizes-control-of-central-bank-amid-steady-gains-in-khartoum?utm)
of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) within the capital, Khartoum, and earlier in Al-
Jazirah State. This shift enabled Sudanese Army forces to reassert control over 
key military positions and systematically dislodge RSF combatants from urban strongholds
where they had been deployed. As a result, the militia increasingly relied on[ loitering **UAVs**](https://www.military.africa/2023/03/sudans-mic-unveils-kamin-25-uav-launched-loitering-munition/),
believed to be launched from the city of [Nyala](https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/73142835-15d7-4b8e-9c18-53bcecf5a184?utm).
These are described as “strategic” **UAVs**, referring to their ability to fly for
long periods, cover great distances, and execute precise strikes targeting sensitive
and high-value locations such as airports and command headquarters, or to assassinate
prominent figures.

**Early Use of UAVs and the Current Shift**

Notably, it is important to highlight that the militia had begun using **UAVs **
since the start of the conflict. However, their use at that stage was limited to
short-range **UAVs **(with ranges between 4 and 20 km), primarily used for reconnaissance,
artillery fire correction, and dropping 120 mm calibre [shells](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-rsf-drones-tip-balance-sudans-war?utm).
This limited use contributed to tangible field gains, including the RSF’s expansion
outside Khartoum and the seizure of strategic positions, as well as inflicting significant
losses on the Sudanese army.

In the current phase, however, and with the shift towards using strategic **UAVs**,
the airstrikes—despite their precision and qualitative [damage](https://english.sun.mv/95781?utm)—
have not translated into tangible ground gains. From a strategic calculus perspective,
losses suffered by one party do not necessarily lead to gains for the other. Air
superiority unlinked to the ability to exploit ground conditions and alter military
geography diminishes the value of airstrikes and reduces their military and political
significance.

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In one major development, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) successfully neutralised
a Sudanese military Antonov-12 aircraft near the city of [Al-Fashir on April 3, 2025](https://www.darfur24.com/en/2025/04/03/rsf-shoot-down-warplane-in-el-fasher-north-darfur/?utm).
This incident suggests that the militia has acquired more advanced air defence systems;
thus, the potential targeting and disruption of UAV launch platforms now poses a
strategically significant threat to the operational capabilities of the Sudanese
Armed Forces and may effectively challenge SAF’s air superiority, marking a potentially
dangerous turning point in the conflict. In the early stages of the conflict, the
militia was able to neutralise helicopters and posed a threat to the [army’s drones](https://www.military.africa/2023/04/sudans-small-but-deadly-drone-fleet-could-turn-the-tide-of-war/)
by using anti-aircraft guns of 23 mm and 14.5 mm calibres, as well as Man-portable
air defence systems (MANPADS) such as the SAM-7 and FN-6. The RSF’s alleged deployment
of advanced air defence systems, if substantiated, would pose an escalating threat
to the [Sudanese Air Force’s operational dominance](https://www.military.africa/2023/06/sudan-air-force-suffers-significant-losses-in-recent-conflict/)
across multiple theatres of engagement.

**What Should Be Done**

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Regional and international experiences—from the Houthis’ use of **UAVs **against
Aramco facilities, to the capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, which managed to 
penetrate the Israeli air defense system, and up to the extensive use of **UAVs **
in the Ukraine war—indicate that airspace is no longer a guaranteed domain for powerful
states. **UAVs **have become a real security dilemma for the strong before the weak,
due to their difficulty detecting, low cost, and ability to bypass the most advanced
defence systems, such as the Patriot and Iron Dome.

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In light of these facts, it is expected that the militia in Sudan will seek to move
to a new phase, consisting of [launching swarms of UAVs](https://www.military.africa/2024/10/swarm-drones-a-new-phase-in-the-sudan-conflict/)
against advanced air defence systems that the Sudanese army may seek to introduce.
Therefore, the appropriate response—given the absence of an effective solution against
UAVs —is to form a multi-layered air defence system commonly known as a multi-layered
fire control system that integrates traditional methods with advanced technologies.
This system should include anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, [C-UAS technologies](https://www.military.africa/2024/04/sudan-army-combat-rsf-drones-with-chinese-skyfend-hunter-c-uas/),
and advanced radars connected to early warning systems and automated response weapons.
By considering the ability to predict potential targets, military leaders can reconfigure
and redeploy the multi-layered system in a way that focuses on protecting strategically
important sites, ensuring enhanced effectiveness in facing increasing aerial threats.

Nevertheless, the acquisition of such capabilities—despite financial challenges 
and the constraints imposed on Sudan—does not inherently ensure operational efficacy.
Its efficiency remains fundamentally dependent on the actors’ awareness of the need
to achieve a high level of understanding and integration between technical and military
personnel. Technical teams are responsible for identifying the best technological
solutions to counter aerial threats, while military commanders must choose the optimal
locations for deploying these systems to ensure the multi-layered system operates
efficiently. Notably, competition between technical and military teams has become
a familiar feature in such contexts, as institutional internal conflicts often hinder
the achievement of desired goals.

**Albadawi Rahmtall: A researcher specialising in critical security studies.**

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